Jurisdiction – Long-arm statute

Listen to this article

Where a plaintiff father has filed suit against his daughter, a New Jersey resident, I find that he hasn't pleaded sufficient facts to permit the present court to assert personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Judge's reasoning

"In order for this court to exercise personal jurisdiction over [defendant Charlotte] Skevington, a New Jersey resident, there must be a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether jurisdiction is authorized by the statute, G.L.c. 223A, §3 and (2) if authorized, does the exercise of that jurisdiction comport with the basic due process requirements mandated by the United States Constitution? … The answer to both inquiries must be affirmative and even if jurisdiction is constitutionally acceptable, the specific circumstances of the case must come within one of the specific provisions of G.L.c. 223A, §3 for jurisdiction to exist. … Further, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by sufficient factual allegations that personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the Long Arm Statute exists. …

"Here [plaintiff Maurice] Dew, now a resident of Shirley, Massachusetts, seeks jurisdiction to be exercised over a New Jersey resident, Skevington, for acts committed while Dew was in her care in New Jersey.

"Constitutionally, ‘[t]he governing principle is the fairness of subjecting a defendant to suit in a distant forum. Only if the nonresident defendant has such "minimum contacts" with the state "that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and justice," … or if the defendant has performed some act "by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws," … may the forum, consistently with due process, extend its long arm to embrace it.' …

"Upon this motion record, it cannot be found that Skevington had the minimum legal contacts with Massachusetts necessary to meet the constitutional due process requirements. …

"Additionally the facts do not reveal that Skevington's actions come within one of the specific subsections of G.L.c. 223A, §3. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, which sounds primarily in conversion, attempts to bootstrap all of the claims for actions committed in New Jersey upon the single statement that Skevington was observed in Massachusetts removing a plastic bag with contents and a T.V. from Dew's premises. Nothing further is pleaded concerning this act. Nonetheless plaintiff argues that personal jurisdiction may be exercised over Skevington for causing, by this act, ‘tortious injury by an act or omission in this Commonwealth.' … This act, would not however, by itself, confer Massachusetts jurisdiction over Skevington for all of her alleged New Jersey actions. Moreover there are no facts pleaded which would lead one to conclude, even accepting the averments as being true, that Skevington's removal of the large plastic bag and television is wrongful.

"The plaintiff has failed to establish Long Aim Jurisdiction over Skevington pursuant to G.L c. 223A, §3.

"For the above stated reasons the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is allowed."

Dew v. Skevington (Lawyers Weekly No. 12-131-10) (5 pages) (Tucker, J.) (Worcester Superior Court) (Docket No. 09-1967) (May 19, 2010).