Employment – Public policy – Constructive discharge

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Where a defendant who previously worked for the plaintiff has moved for leave to assert a wrongful discharge counterclaim, the motion should be denied because the factual allegations do not plausibly suggest that the defendant was constructively discharged, nor do they plausibly suggest that he was forced out in violation of public policy.

“Brian Stewart used to work for CoreMap, Inc., which is working to develop cardiac electrophysiology mapping technology. CoreMap claims that when Stewart left the company he kept or took some of its trade secrets or other confidential information. Stewart now seeks leave to assert counterclaims against CoreMap and third-party claims against its CEO, Sarah Kalil. …

“Stewart contends that he was constructively discharged and forced to leave CoreMap in retaliation for lodging criticisms inside the company about the manner in which Kalil was having CoreMap conduct pre-clinical testing of certain products. These allegations do not plausibly suggest that CoreMap can be held liable on a theory of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy for two, independent reasons.

“First, the factual allegations in the proposed counterclaims do not plausibly suggest that Stewart was constructively discharged. A constructive discharge occurs only where an employee is forced to endure working conditions ‘so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.’ …

“Stewart alleges that he quit his job because his ‘numerous warnings about public safety went ignored by CoreMap.’ Assuming that to be true, as the Court must at this stage of the proceeding, that allegation does not state a viable constructive discharge claim because it does not plausibly suggest that Stewart’s working conditions were objectively intolerable.

“Second, even if the proposed counterclaims adequately alleged a constructive discharge, they do not plausibly suggest that Stewart was forced out in violation of public policy. …

“Allegedly firing Stewart because he criticized other CoreMap officers or employees does not constitute wrongful termination in violation of public policy as a matter of law. …

“Similarly, if Stewart were fired because he disagreed with internal CoreMap practices or procedures, as he also seems to allege, that would not violate public policy either. ‘[T]he internal administration, policy, functioning, and other matters of an organization cannot be the basis for a public policy exception to the general rule that at-will employees are terminable at any time with or without cause.’ … Nor does Stewart allege that he was fired for making internal reports of criminal conduct. …

“Stewart’s proposed separate claim for ‘retaliation’ would also be futile, as it appears to be duplicative of his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The cause of action for wrongful termination of an at-will employee in violation of public policy, discussed above, is sometimes referred to as a common law ‘claim for retaliation.’ … The Court is not aware of and Stewart has not identified any Massachusetts appellate case law recognizing a free-standing, common-law cause of action for ‘retaliation’ that is distinct from Stewart’s proposed wrongful termination claim. …

“The allegation that Kalil falsely told people that Stewart ‘stole’ data from CoreMap and used it on behalf of his new employer states a viable claim for defamation.

“Since the allegation of criminal conduct like theft ‘is defamatory per se,’ the burden will be on Kalil ‘to prove truth as an affirmative defense.’ … Whether Kalil will be able to do so cannot be resolved at the pleading stage. …

“The facts alleged in the proposed pleading plausibly suggest that CoreMap and its CEO are liable under the Massachusetts Wage Act for not paying Stewart all the wages that were owed to him. CoreMap and Kalil insist that Stewart’s factual allegations are incorrect and based on ‘miscalculations.’ But the Court must assume that Stewart’s allegations are true for the purpose of deciding whether his proposed claims would be futile. …

“Stewart’s proposed claim against CoreMap under G.L.c. 93A is based on an allegation that CoreMap threatened to enforce Stewart’s non-competition agreement.

“This claim would be futile because Stewart’s factual allegations do not plausibly suggest that he suffered any kind of compensable injury as a result of this alleged threat. Proof of legally cognizable harm or injury is a necessary element of any claim under G.L.c. 93A. …

“Stewart’s failure to allege any adverse consequence or loss makes the proposed c. 93A claim futile. …

“Stewart’s claim that CoreMap was unjustly enriched because it did not pay him all of his wages would be futile because he has an adequate remedy under the Wage Act. …

“The Court will permit Stewart to press his proposed claim seeking a declaration as to whether his non-competition agreement is enforceable. There is an actual controversy regarding this issue, as demonstrated by CoreMap’s demand letter. In addition, Stewart has standing to seeking a declaration as to whether the non-competition agreement is enforceable, he has joined all necessary parties, and he has stated a plausible claim. Nothing more is required to state a claim for declaratory judgment. …

“Defendant’s motion for leave to file counterclaims and third-party claims (docket no. 21) is allowed in part with respect to the proposed defamation claim against Sarah Kalil, Wage Act claim against CoreMap, Inc., and Ms. Kalil, and claim for a declaratory judgment as to whether his non-competition agreement with CoreMap is enforceable. This ruling is without prejudice to Ms. Kalil challenging the exercise of personal jurisdiction over her in this case. This motion is denied in part with respect to Defendant’s proposed counterclaims against CoreMap for wrongful discharge, retaliation, violating G.L.c. 93A, and unjust enrichment.”

CoreMap, Inc. v. Stewart (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-088-25) (6 pages) (Salinger, J.) (Suffolk Superior Court) (Docket No. 2484CV02619-BLS2) (June 9, 2025).

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