Criminal – Parole – Youth-related factors

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Where a plaintiff serving a life sentence for committing rape at the age of 16 sought review of the parole board’s fourth denial of his request for parole, the board “has taken youth-related attributes into account in coming to its decision,” so a Superior Court judgment in its favor should be upheld.

“The plaintiff, Jose Rodriguez, who is serving a life sentence for committing rape at the age of sixteen, sought review in the Superior Court of the parole board’s (board’s) fourth denial of his request for parole. He now appeals from the judgment entered in favor of the board, arguing, as he did below, that he was denied the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release’ that is to be afforded to juvenile offenders who have been sentenced to life in prison. Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12, 19 (2015) (Diatchenko II). We affirm. …

“Because the board in its decision considered a set of facts that reasonably may be connected to the various youth-related factors, we affirm. …

“The plaintiff contends that the board insufficiently considered his advanced age and his rehabilitative efforts as factors weighing in favor of his release, insufficiently explained its reasons for denying him parole in its written decision, utilized an inappropriate tool (Level of Service/Case Management Inventory) to perform the statutorily required ‘risk and needs assessment,’ and prejudiced his future attempts to secure parole by failing to release its decision until ten months after his review hearing. These arguments fall outside the scope of our review. We have emphasized that our review is limited to determining whether the board has taken into account the youth-related factors in making its decision, and that we will remand the decision only if the board has failed to do so. … As explained supra, we conclude that the board has taken youth-related attributes into account in coming to its decision; the plaintiff does not argue otherwise.

“Apart from his invocation of protections for juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment flowing from art. 26 as interpreted in Diatchenko II, the plaintiff anchors his challenges in vague appeals to constitutional due process guarantees. However, we previously have held that prisoners in the Commonwealth lack due process rights in connection with their parole applications under the Federal Constitution. …

“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment affirming the board’s decision to deny the plaintiff release on parole.”

Rodriguez v. Massachusetts Parole Board (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-113-22) (13 pages) (Budd, C.J.) The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on motions for judgment on the pleadings. Melissa Allen Celli for the plaintiff; Todd M. Blume for the defendant; Benjamin Winters, of the District of Columbia, and Caitriona Fitzgerald submitted a brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center, amicus curiae; Robert Hennessy, for private counsel division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services and another, amici curiae, submitted a brief (Docket No. SJC-13197) (Sept. 6, 2022).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.