Education – Interscholastic athletics – Eligibility

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Where the Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association declared a high school senior, who had repeated his junior year and had played a total of four prior years on his schools’ interscholastic teams, ineligible to play a fifth year of interscholastic football and basketball, the MIAA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, so it was error for a Superior Court judge to grant the student’s request for a preliminary injunction.

“The Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association (MIAA) declared a high school senior, who had repeated his junior year and had played a total of four prior years on his schools’ interscholastic teams, ineligible to play a fifth year of interscholastic football and basketball, and denied his request for an exception, as permitted under MIAA rules. The student then challenged the MIAA’s eligibility determination through a complaint in the Superior Court in the nature of certiorari, posing the novel question of the standard of review courts should apply in reviewing such claims. We conclude that a reviewing court should examine a challenge to an MIAA eligibility determination only to determine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious. Applying that standard of review to the facts of this case, we conclude that the MIAA’s decision not to grant the student his requested exception was not arbitrary and capricious. …

“A student who is ineligible to compete under MIAA Rule 59.1 may petition the MIAA for an ‘eligibility waiver,’ i.e., a decision by the MIAA to set aside the effect of any rule bearing on the student’s eligibility to participate in interscholastic high school sports. … In reviewing a student’s appeal, the [MIAA’s eligibility appeal board (EAB)] weighs the four factors set forth in MIAA Rule 87.5: (1) that the four-year rule imposes an undue hardship on the student; (2) that waiver of the rule will not result in an unfair competitive advantage; (3) that the waiver application addresses the manner in which allowance of a waiver would affect the student body of the applicant’s school; and (4) that a waiver would not be in conflict with the MIAA’s general interscholastic objectives. …

“… A student seeking eligibility to participate in a fifth year of high school interscholastic athletics ‘has no right to the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution].’ … Thus, a determination whether a student is eligible to participate in interscholastic sports for MIAA member schools is a matter that remains committed to the MIAA’s discretion. …

“Accordingly, the proper standard of review of an eligibility determination by the MIAA is, as the motion judge held, the arbitrary and capricious standard. …

“The plaintiffs argue that the judge was within his discretion to conclude that the MIAA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting their application for a waiver. The plaintiffs contend that the EAB failed to consider evidence of the student’s mental health issues and the harm to his mental health that could result from being unable to play interscholastic football and basketball; in particular, the plaintiffs point to a report by the student’s therapist in which the therapist discussed some of the student’s interactions with the prior coach at his former school, the bullying and harassment the student experienced from the coach and other students, and the improvements in his mental health that the student has experienced in his role on his new team. The plaintiffs also asserted, in their verified complaint, that during the father’s testimony at the EAB hearing, he explained that his ‘biggest fear’ was that if his son ‘can’t do sports, we will lose him again’ due to mental health issues. …

“As is clear from the language of the decision, the EAB considered each of the four factors enumerated in MIAA Rule 87.5 22 regarding whether a waiver should issue, and it anchored its analysis of each factor in the evidence presented at the second hearing and the documentary evidence submitted in advance of that hearing. As discussed, the decision did recognize and credit the evidence of the student’s mental health difficulties, and the student’s allegations concerning the bullying at his former school and its impact on his mental health. Nonetheless, the decision placed greater emphasis on other facts, such as the student’s having played on interscholastic teams for four years in two different sports and the potential opportunities which, in the EAB’s view, some other student likely would miss if the student were allowed to play. In this regard, while noting that the school had indicated that it would not cut anyone from either team if the student returned for a final senior year, the EAB emphasized that the student would likely take playing time that otherwise would have gone to other students, given his recognized athletic abilities.

“The record contains adequate evidentiary support for the EAB’s positions. It is clear from the testimony and the questions asked at the hearing that the EAB was extremely concerned and very focused on the concept of a ‘level playing field,’ and treating all ‘230,000′ student athletes in Massachusetts equally. While the plaintiffs’ attorney argued that the student’s was a ‘unique’ situation, and that playing on the interscholastic teams was helping to heal the student’s mental health issues still remaining from the trauma of the events at the public school, the EAB emphasized that it wanted each student athlete in the Commonwealth to be treated equally, and that many others have missed out on classes and sports as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, but they were not seeking waivers. Because the EAB decision addressed and analyzed each of the factors in the MIAA rule on granting waivers, and reached conclusions based on the evidence at the hearings, the decision was not arbitrary and capricious. … Accordingly, the Superior Court judge erred in deciding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail in their complaint, and thus that the preliminary injunction should issue. …

“The order allowing the preliminary injunction is vacated and set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.”

Abner A., et al. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Association (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-110-22) (23 pages) (Gaziano, J.) A motion for a preliminary injunction was heard by Michael P. Doolin, J., in Superior Court. Kay H. Hodge (John M. Simon also present) for the defendant; Andrew R. Hamilton (Adam M. Hamel also present) for the plaintiffs (Docket No. SJC-13224) (Aug. 29, 2022).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.