Employment – Statute of limitations

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Where a plaintiff physician was terminated from his employment, his claims are time-barred except for three that are based on an allegation that the defendant employer intentionally shared an incorrect report with the board of registration in medicine and the National Practitioners Data Bank on Oct. 28, 2011.

Accordingly, so much of a judgment as dismisses those counts as to defendant Cambridge Health Alliance is vacated.

“Following the death of one of his patients, the plaintiff, Dr. Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, was summarily suspended by his employer, defendant Cambridge Health Alliance (CHA). When further investigation led to the termination of his employment, Padmanabhan filed a sprawling fifty-six-page complaint asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants. After removal of the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and remand to the Superior Court, a Superior Court judge dismissed Padmanabhan’s amended complaint on statute of limitations grounds. Padmanabhan appeals from the judgment of dismissal.

“We conclude that, though many of Padmanabhan’s claims were properly dismissed, three claims, based on separate injuries flowing from acts within the limitations period, survive. We accordingly vacate a portion of the judgment. …

“The parties do not dispute that a three-year statute of limitations applies to all of Padmanabhan’s various claims. …

“… The amended complaint, when read in the light most favorable to Padmanabhan, alleges wrongful conduct that occurred after October 17, 2011, most notably that CHA provided a false report to the board and the NPDB on October 28, 2011.15 To the extent that Padmanabhan’s claims are grounded in such conduct, they are not barred by the statute of limitations, and it was error to dismiss them on that ground. …

“Having determined that at least some of Padmanabhan’s claims were timely, we turn to the alternative grounds for dismissal advanced by the defendants. … After careful consideration, we conclude that dismissal was proper as to (1) the board members and board staff defendants and claims related only to them, because they are entitled to quasi judicial absolute immunity for their acts taken in connection with the disciplinary proceedings against Padmanabhan; (2) certain other defendants, because the amended complaint contains insufficient allegations to support claims against them; (3) Padmanabhan’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and (4) Padmanabhan’s request for a declaration that the Attorney General should not be allowed to represent certain defendants, because the dismissal of his claims against all such defendants renders the request moot. …

“We consider the reasoning of Bettencourt [v. Board of Registration in Med., 904 F.2d 772 (1st Cir. 1990)] to be persuasive and adopt it. The extension of immunity to administrative agents associated with functionally judicial administrative proceedings is aligned with our traditional principles of judicial absolute immunity. … We therefore adopt Bettencourt‘s three-part test and, applying it to the case at bar, conclude that the board members and staff are entitled to quasi judicial absolute immunity from Padmanabhan’s claims. …

“Padmanabhan’s amended complaint names some seventy-two defendants and contains eight causes of action. Based on our analysis above, the only surviving claims are those predicated on well-pleaded allegations of conduct by a nonimmune defendant within the limitations period. The sole allegation Padmanabhan makes satisfying those criteria is that CHA intentionally shared an incorrect report with the board and the NPDB on October 28, 2011. In our view, that allegation is sufficient to support count two (retaliation under 42 U.S.C. section1983), count four (defamation under 42 U.S.C. section1983 and State law), and the final specifically-pleaded instance of fraud in count eight of the amended complaint. So much of count one as seeks a declaratory judgment based on those claims also survives. Accordingly, so much of the judgment as dismisses those counts as to defendant CHA is vacated. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.”

Padmanabhan v. City of Cambridge, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-028-21) (21 pages) (Green, C.J.) Motions to dismiss were heard by Rosalind H. Miller, J., and a motion to file an amended complaint was also heard by her. Bharanidharan Padmanabhan, pro se; Rebecca A. Cobbs for the city of Cambridge and others; Mark P. Sutliff for Judyann Bigby and others (Docket No. 20-P-47) (March 22, 2021).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.