Environmental – Chapter 21E – Declaratory relief

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Where a plaintiff landowner has filed a complaint seeking a declaration that it is exempt from liability to the defendant pursuant to the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act (G.L.c. 21E), the complaint should not be dismissed despite the defendant’s contentions that the plaintiff does not have standing, that there is no actual controversy between the parties, and that the plaintiff has not joined all necessary parties.

“Plaintiff HRE Grove Street, LLC (HRE) owns property adjacent to property once owned by defendant Raytheon Company (Raytheon).  HRE brought this action after Raytheon demanded that HRE pay for costs that Raytheon incurred and continues to incur in remediating contamination on its own property pursuant to the Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act, G.L. c. 21E (Chapter 21E).  HRE seeks a declaration that it is exempt from liability (Count I); alternatively, it seeks a declaration that any liability to Raytheon is several only, rather than joint and several (Count II). Should it prevail on these claims, HRE also seeks reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to G.L.c. 21E, section15. Defendants now move to dismiss all three claims pursuant to Mass. R. Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7). …

“Raytheon makes several arguments in support of its Motion to Dismiss. First, it contends that HRE does not have standing: the Complaint relates to HRE’s liability under Chapter 21E, but Chapter 21E does not create a private right of action for those in HRE’s position. Second, Raytheon argues that there is no actual controversy between the parties as required by G.L.c. 231 section1 and that this action would not in any event terminate any controversy that does exist.  Finally, it maintains that the action must be dismissed because HRE has not joined all necessary parties. …

“… HRE points out that it is not seeking contribution for its own response costs, but is rather seeking a declaration regarding its own legal rights and responsibilities, which is what the declaratory relief statute permits. This Court agrees with HRE that, so long as other requirements of G.L.c. 231A section1 are satisfied, there is nothing in Chapter 21E that prevents it from seeking  a judicial determination as to its legal obligations under that statute. …

“That is not to say that the right to seek declaratory relief in such circumstances is an absolute one. … There is nothing in Chapter 21E, however, that expressly prevents HRE from asking this Court to decide the questions Counts I and II address. … In short, this Court concludes that, having reached a stalemate in negotiations, HRE is not doing an end run around Chapter 21E but rather seeking to enforce the protections that it says the statute affords it.

“Raytheon next argues that Counts I and II must be dismissed because the present lawsuit does not involve an ‘actual controversy’ as required by G.L.c. 231 section1 nor would it terminate the uncertainty of any controversy which does exist. This Court disagrees. …

“… This Court is convinced that, based on a fair reading of the Complaint, allowing this action to go forward will resolve a fundamental disagreement between the parties regarding HRE’s liability to Raytheon for costs that Raytheon has incurred removing hazardous materials from its own property. …

“… Here, there is no indication that there are parties who have an ‘independent legal interest’ that must be decided in order to adjudicate HRE’s claims for declaratory relief — nor does Raytheon attempt to identify such a person or entity. …”

HRE Grove Street, LLC v. Raytheon Company (Lawyers Weekly No. 09-110-19) (10 pages) (Sanders, J.) (Suffolk Superior Court) (Civil Action No. 2019-1677-BLS2) (Oct. 16, 2019).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.