Criminal – Murder – Intoxication

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Where a defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation, the verdict should be reduced to murder in the second degree.

“[A]lthough the prosecutor’s statement that the defendant’s possible intoxication did not ‘excuse’ his actions was technically consistent with the law, we are concerned that the prosecutor crossed the line into a misstatement of the law. … It is true that intoxication does not serve as an excuse in the way that, for instance, self-defense does. … In the context of the trial as a whole and the rest of the prosecutor’s closing argument, however, the prosecutor’s statement regarding excuse appears to be a colloquial suggestion that the defendant’s intoxication could neither excuse his actions nor diminish his culpability. Thus, the prosecutor’s pronouncement that the defendant’s intoxication was no excuse for his actions adversely had an impact on the effectiveness of the judge’s intoxication instruction.

“That error, however, was not significant enough that our confidence in the jury’s decision is shaken. …

“… [T]his case presents one of the rare situations in which we conclude that the jury’s verdict of murder in the first degree was supported by the evidence, but was not consonant with justice. …

“… There was sufficient evidence before the jury to support their conclusion that the defendant had killed the victim after deliberate premeditation, but it was far from compelling. In addition to there being no definitive evidence as to what happened in the apartment on the night of the killing other than the victim being stabbed multiple times, there is nothing to suggest that there was any ill will between the defendant and the victim, or to suggest that there was any motive for the killing. … The defendant’s intoxication is another factor that we consider, particularly where it was incompletely presented as a defense and where the prosecutor made an inappropriate statement about it in his closing argument. … In sum, we conclude that a conviction of murder in the second degree is more consonant with justice and we reduce the verdict accordingly.”

Commonwealth v. Salazar (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-204-18) (27 pages) (Lowy, J.) Case heard by Hinkle, J.; a motion for a new trial heard by Wilkins, J., and a motion for reconsideration considered by him. Amy M. Belger for the defendant; Kathryn E. Leary (John P. Pappas also present) for the commonwealth (Docket No. SJC-10566) (Dec. 14, 2018).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion (corrected version issued June 2019).