Insurance – Workers’ compensation

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Where the plaintiff alleges that the defendant insurance companies wrongfully

failed to pay his workers’ compensation claim, engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of G.L.c. 93A, defamed him in violation of G.L.c. 176D, section3(3), and refused to conduct a reasonable investigation of his claims in violation of G.L.c. 176D, section3(9)(d), the defendants’ motion to dismiss must be granted because adjudication of the plaintiff’s claims in this court is barred by the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Act.

“All of plaintiff’s claims are barred because his sole remedy is through the Massachusetts Workers’ Compensation Act (‘MWCA’), M.G.L.c. 152.

“It is undisputed that plaintiff was an employee of Viceroy Chemical, that his alleged reaction to a chemical exposure is a ‘personal injury’ under the MWCA, and that it arose out of his employment. … Plaintiff alleges that he has exhausted his administrative remedies; defendants contend that he actually withdrew all three of his administrative claims. On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true, but here the fact is immaterial: the MWCA does not require a plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing a claim in federal district court — rather, it completely bars his right to sue. … Plaintiff does not allege that he has retained that right; to the contrary, the complaint acknowledges that his ‘personal injuries fall within the jurisdiction of workers comp.’ … And because the activity plaintiff complains of was undertaken by the defendant insurers acting ‘in the shoes of’ plaintiff’s employer to further the goals of the MWCA, the bar applies to suits against those insurers as well. … Therefore, to the extent plaintiff is seeking compensation for his underlying injury, this Court is without any authority to award it.

“Plaintiff’s claims under M.G.L. Chapters 93A and 176D, section3 are also barred by the MWCA. As defendants point out, Fleming v. National Union Fire Insurance. Co., 445 Mass. 381 (2005), is remarkably similar to this case. There, the plaintiffs sued their employer’s workers’ compensation insurer for allegedly violating Chapters 93A and 176D, section3(9) in the course of handling their claims. … The court concluded that ‘[i]n light of this comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme that affords injured workers the opportunity to contest benefit determinations and payment practices, we conclude that employees …who believe that their employer or its insurer had engaged in questionable claims handling techniques[] have an avenue for obtaining redress with respect to alleged misconduct’ and that ‘[g]iven the breadth of the workers’ compensation framework, it is evident that the Legislature intended employees to seek relief for purported unfair or deceptive business practices in the workers’ compensation realm through G.L.c. 152, and not by way of action pursuant to G.L.c. 93A.’ …

“For the same reasons, plaintiff’s claims under Chapters 93A and 176D, section3 will be dismissed.”

Chen v. Hartford Insurance Co., Inc., et al.  (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-595-17) (8 pages) (Saylor, J.) (Civil Action No. 17-cv-10596) (Nov. 9, 2017).

Click here for the full-text opinion.