Prisons – Sanctions – Garden program

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Where the North Central Correctional Institution (NCCI) has a policy of terminating inmates from a leisure program as a result of guilty findings, that policy does not violate the prohibition against imposing more than one sanction per offense under 103 C.M.R. section430.25.

Accordingly, a grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff inmate is reversed.

Majority’s reasoning

“The garden program gives inmates access to dangerous instrumentalities. Given the potential security risk, prison officials in their professional judgment created the garden program rules. The rules require that an inmate be terminated from the program after a guilty finding for any disciplinary report and give the prison administration discretion to terminate an inmate from the program at any time. Prison officials may use their professional judgment and decide to terminate a prisoner from the garden program to ensure the safety of the prison. The process created for terminating an inmate from the garden program is separate from a disciplinary proceeding in which, once the inmate’s guilt is determined, one sanction may be imposed. …

“We recognize that ‘[o]nce an agency has seen fit to promulgate regulations, it must comply with those regulations,’ even if a matter is generally within the agency’s discretion. … However, here, neither termination from employment nor termination from the garden program are sanctions that can be applied to an inmate under the disciplinary process. As a result, neither of these actions is an additional sanction under the regulations. Furthermore, it is clear from the Deputy Superintendent’s affidavit that the goal in terminating the plaintiff from the garden program was not punishment for the offenses to which he pleaded guilty, but maintaining a secure and safe environment within the institution.

“Accordingly, the portion of the judgment allowing summary judgment for the plaintiff on count IV is reversed, and judgment is to enter allowing summary judgment for the defendants on that count. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.”

Dissenting judge’s comments

Agnes, J. “… [M]y disagreement with the majority is over an important question of first impression: namely, whether prison officials have the authority to take disciplinary or administrative action against inmates outside the framework of the regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Correction (Commissioner). … In particular, as we recently noted in Ivey v. Commissioner of Correction, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 18, 25-26 (2015), in imposing discipline against an inmate, the Department of Correction is bound to follow the regulatory framework established by the Commissioner. … The defendants concede there is no published decision that supports their view that their authority to discipline inmates extends beyond what is contained in the regulations adopted by the Commissioner. The majority opinion does not cite any appellate decision that endorses such a view. … I do not believe the authority asserted by the defendants and confirmed by the majority exists. As the Supreme Judicial Court observed in Royce v. Commissioner of Correction, 390 Mass. 425, 427 (1983), ‘courts permit prison administrators considerable discretion in the adoption and implementation of prison policies. However, the limits of such discretion are established by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Department of Correction. Once an agency has seen fit to promulgate regulations, it must comply with those regulations’ (citations omitted). I believe the defendants violated this precept. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.”

LaChance v. Commissioner of Correction, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-160-15) (20 pages) (Trainor, J.) (Agnes, J., dissenting) (Appeals Court) Case heard by Hopkins, J., on motions for summary judgment, and motions for reconsideration considered by her. David J. Rentsch for the defendants; Edmund D. LaChance Jr., pro se (Docket No. 14-P-1648.) (Oct. 13, 2015).