Civil practice – Limitations – SDP

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Where a defendant, charged with being sexually dangerous, moved to dismiss the commonwealth's petition for trial, a judge acted correctly in denying the dismissal motion despite the fact that the commonwealth's petition was filed more than 14 days after the filing of reports by qualified examiners.

"At issue in this case is whether dismissal is required following the Commonwealth's violation of one of the procedural deadlines in G.L.c. 123A, §14(a). On November 20, 2007, after a probable cause hearing, a judge in the Superior Court committed Jose Alvarado to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) for evaluation by two qualified examiners, pursuant to G.L.c. 123A, §13(a). Forty-three days later, on January 2, 2008, the qualified examiners filed their reports, finding Alvarado to be sexually dangerous. The Commonwealth filed a petition for trial on January 18, 2008, sixteen days after the qualified examiners had filed their reports but within sixty days of the November 20, 2007, order of commitment. Because G.L.c. 123A, §14(a), requires a petition for trial be filed within fourteen days of the qualified examiners' reports, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the Commonwealth's delay. A different judge in the Superior Court denied the defendant's motion. We granted the defendant's application for direct appellate review. We affirm the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss. …

"The defendant's argument is that the fourteen-day deadline within which the Commonwealth must file its petition, like the over-all sixty-day limit on his confinement, is intended to protect his liberty interest. And like the sixty-day limit, the defendant contends that any violation, no matter how small, must result in dismissal. We conclude that the violations of the Commonwealth's fourteen-day deadline should be analyzed in the same manner as violations of the qualified examiners' forty-five day deadline. The two deadlines are designed to work together, as two component parts of a single sixty-day period. The larger sixty-day period is intended to protect the liberty interest of the defendant. The two smaller time periods within it collectively represent an allocation of that available time between the qualified examiners and the Commonwealth, and are not individually intended to protect the liberty interest of the defendant. Therefore, ordinary violations of the fourteen-day deadline, like violations of the forty-five day deadline, do not result in prejudice to the defendant's liberty interest, and do not require dismissal. …"

Commonwealth v. Alvarado (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-155-08) (6 pages) (Botsford, J.) (SJC) Following an order of temporary commitment issued by Velis, J., a motion to dismiss was heard by Page, J., in Superior Court. Harry L. Miles, of Green, Miles, Lipton & Fitz-Gibbon, for the defendant; Thomas H. Townsend for the commonwealth (Docket No. SJC-10189) (Aug. 15, 2008).