Employment – Discrimination – Retaliation

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Where a defendant supervisor has moved to dismiss claims brought by a plaintiff employee, that motion should be denied because each of the claims against the supervisor is plausibly alleged.

“Plaintiff Vanessa Ferranto was an employee of defendant Genesys Cloud Services, Inc. for several years. She claims that Genesys and two of her former supervisors — defendants Charles Quincy and Elcenora Martinez — discriminated against her based on her sex by taking various adverse employment actions against her leading up to, throughout, and upon her return from maternity leave. Ferranto asserts claims of discrimination, retaliation, and aiding and abetting of discrimination under M.G.L.c. 151B, as well as a claim of wrongful termination, against all three defendants. Genesys and Martinez filed answers to the complaint, but Quincy has moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. That motion will be denied, as each of Ferranto’s claims against Quincy is plausibly alleged. …

“Count I asserts that Quincy discriminated against Ferranto based on her sex in violation of M.G.L.c. 151B, §4(1). …

“There is no dispute that Ferranto, as a woman, is a member of a protected class and that she performed her job at an acceptable level. Nor is there any dispute that Quincy subjected her to adverse employment actions when he demoted her from her job as Senior Director of Product Management, Journey Management while she was on maternity leave and then placed her on a PIP within three weeks of her return to the office. Instead, Quincy argues that Ferranto does not plausibly allege that he possessed discriminatory animus toward her. But a plaintiff need not have direct evidence of discriminatory animus to survive a motion to dismiss, particularly where, as here, she is proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)] framework. And Quincy does not meaningfully contest that Ferranto has plausibly alleged a prima facie case of sex discrimination under that framework. But even if Ferranto did have a burden to plausibly allege discriminatory animus on the basis of sex, she has easily crossed the plausibility threshold on that element. According to the complaint, Ferranto, a female employee with leadership responsibilities and years of tenure at Genesys, disclosed her pregnancy to her supervisor, gave birth, and went on maternity leave in accordance with company policy. … Just two weeks before she was slated to return to work, Quincy — her new supervisor — having never met her but knowing she was on maternity leave, demoted her from her job as Senior Director of Product Management, Journey Management to an individual contributor role. … Then, within three weeks of her return, he had placed her on a PIP. … These allegations give rise to a plausible inference that Quincy demoted Ferranto and placed her on a PIP because of her sex. Ferranto’s claim of sex discrimination against Quincy will not be dismissed. …

“Count II claims that Quincy retaliated against Ferranto by placing her on a PIP and later terminating her because, through counsel, she sent a letter to Genesys concerning its alleged ‘unlawful and discriminatory treatment of [her] after she disclosed her pregnancy and during her pregnancy leave.’ …

“Quincy does not dispute that Ferranto engaged in protected conduct by, on August 19, 2024, sending the letter to Genesys objecting to its alleged discriminatory treatment of her. Nor does he dispute that she experienced adverse actions when she was placed on a PIP on September 19, 2024 and then terminated from Genesys on October 25, 2024. Rather, Quincy contends that Ferranto has failed to plausibly allege the necessary causal connection between her letter and the alleged adverse actions, because she does not specifically allege that he had knowledge of the letter. Ferranto counters that, because Quincy supervised her, this Court can, and should, infer that he knew about the letter based on ‘temporal proximity and employer structure.’ …

“Ferranto has the better argument. At the pleading stage, Ferranto’s factual allegations need only give rise to a plausible inference that Quincy had knowledge of the letter. And that plausible inference can be drawn from the fact that Quincy was a member of the Genesys management team and one of Ferranto’s two direct supervisors at the time of the adverse actions, and that the adverse actions followed so closely on the heels of Ferranto’s protected conduct. Ferranto is unlikely, at this early stage in the litigation, to have ready access to information about whether Quincy in fact knew of her letter. In light of Quincy’s plausible knowledge and the one-month gap between the letter and the issuance of the PIP, Ferranto has sufficiently alleged that he retaliated against her because of her protected conduct. …

“Count III alleges that Quincy aided and abetted acts forbidden under Chapter 151B in violation of M.G.L.c. 151B, §4(5). …

“Quincy contends that the allegations directed against him are insufficient to constitute a ‘wholly individual and distinct wrong’ separate from any alleged acts of discrimination or retaliation by Genesys or Martinez. … But Ferranto has, at a minimum, sufficiently alleged that Quincy committed the distinct wrong of demoting Ferranto. … Should judgment enter in Quincy’s favor on the discrimination and retaliation claims against him later in this litigation, that act could constitute a distinct wrong that aided and abetted discrimination or retaliation by Genesys or Martinez. Although Quincy resists this conclusion, he does not offer case law or reasoned argument to support the contention that his demotion of Ferranto does not plausibly qualify as a distinct wrong under Chapter 151B. … And Quincy’s precise role in the series of events alleged in the complaint is a factual matter that should be addressed during discovery.

“Quincy alternatively argues that Ferranto’s aiding and abetting claim fails because she does not plausibly allege that he harbored discriminatory intent against her or that he knew of his supporting role in a scheme to discriminate or retaliate against her. Neither argument stands up. This Court has already determined that Ferranto’s complaint does plausibly allege that Quincy intended to discriminate against her on the basis of sex. And the complaint, as a whole, plausibly alleges that Quincy was, or should have been, aware of his role in an enterprise to discriminate or retaliate against Ferranto. Again, the first action that Quincy took as Ferranto’s new supervisor — before he even met her — was to demote her while she was on maternity leave. And in the two months following her return from leave, she experienced a series of rapid-fire events — exclusion from team meetings, a PIP, a blocked transfer to another team, and a termination — that would have plausibly put any supervisor on notice of a discriminatory or retaliatory enterprise. Ferranto’s aiding and abetting claim will not, accordingly, be dismissed. …

“Count IV asserts that Quincy wrongfully terminated Ferranto for submitting a rebuttal following her placement on the PIP. In general, under Massachusetts law, ‘employment at will can be terminated for any reason or for no reason.’ Meehan v. Medical Info. Tech., Inc., 488 Mass. 730, 732 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). ‘Massachusetts courts have, however, recognized limited exceptions to the general rule when employment is terminated contrary to a well-defined public policy.’ … In Meehan, the Supreme Judicial Court held that termination from employment for exercising the statutory right of rebuttal provided in M.G.L.c. 149, §52C is one such exception. …

“As relevant here, Chapter 149 requires employers to maintain a personnel record for each of their employees and to document in that record, among other things, employee evaluation documents and written warnings of substandard performance. … If an employee disagrees with any information contained in their personnel record, Chapter 149 confers upon them a right to ‘submit a written statement explaining the employee’s position.’ … This right, known as a statutory right of rebuttal, is a legally guaranteed right of employment. Meehan, 488 Mass. at 735. Employees who believe they have been terminated for exercising their statutory right to file a rebuttal may, accordingly, bring a wrongful termination claim under Massachusetts’ public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. …

“Acknowledging that plaintiffs can generally assert Chapter 151B claims and so-called Meehan wrongful termination claims simultaneously, Quincy nonetheless insists that where, as here, the substance of the plaintiff’s rebuttal evokes harms for which Chapter 151B provides a remedy, the Meehan exception is inapplicable. This is so, he asserts, because the public policy exception to the at-will employment rule ‘does not apply where the Legislature has also prescribed a statutory remedy,’ which, in Quincy’s view, it has done through the remedial scheme in Chapter 151B. … Quincy contends that because Ferranto’s rebuttal to her PIP mentioned sex discrimination and retaliation — harms within the scope of Chapter 151B’s remedial scheme — she may not invoke the Meehan public policy exception to claim that she was wrongfully terminated for filing that rebuttal.

“The Court does not need to decide whether a plaintiff can simultaneously press a Chapter 151B claim and a Meehan wrongful termination claim based on a rebuttal that solely describes harms covered by Chapter 151B’s remedial scheme. That is because, as alleged, Ferranto’s rebuttal addressed topics other than the alleged discriminatory treatment and retaliation. Her rebuttal also ‘outlined [her] many successes’ as a member of the Genesys leadership team, discussed her ‘product management leadership skills,’ and expressed her commitment to performing her job responsibilities ‘consistent with the expectation[s] described in the PIP.’ … Where, as here, a rebuttal addresses matters other than the discrimination and retaliation covered by Chapter 151B’s comprehensive remedial scheme, a plaintiff may allege that, in violation of public policy, she was wrongfully terminated for exercising her statutory right to file a rebuttal. Put otherwise, a plaintiff does not lose a claim that she has been wrongfully terminated for filing a rebuttal simply because she included allegations of discrimination or retaliation in that rebuttal. Accordingly, Ferranto has plausibly alleged a Meehan wrongful termination claim independent of her Chapter 151B claims, and that wrongful termination claim will not be dismissed.”

Ferranto v. Genesys Cloud Services, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-231-26) (13 pages) (Kobick, J.) (Docket No. 1:25-cv-12462-JEK) (April 16, 2026).

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