Civil practice – Commitment

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Where a respondent moved to dismiss a commitment petition on jurisdictional grounds, there was no error in the lower court’s decision to deem the motion to dismiss waived.

Affirmed.

“P.W. was involuntarily committed to the UMass Psychiatric Treatment and Recovery Center (‘PTRC’) pursuant to G.L.c. 123, §§7 and 8. Prior to the commitment hearing, P.W.’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds. His appeal is now refined to the single issue of whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he deemed the motion to dismiss ‘waived’ because P.W. would not agree to a continuance or withdraw the motion. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm. …

“Citing Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. C.R., 484 Mass. 472 (2020), P.W.’s counsel argued that P.W.’s due process rights under art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the 14^th Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated because he was involuntarily held for seven days at the UMass Medical Center’s [emergency department (ED)] before he was admitted to PTRC. …

“As a threshold matter, we acknowledge that the commitment order issued on December 28, 2022 has since expired and P.W. was discharged. Therefore, the appeal is moot. However, because the issue presented here is capable of repetition, especially because of protracted ED boarding times at many facilities, and because it involves the restriction of a mental health patient’s liberty, we exercise our discretion and decide the matter. …

“We are unable to decide on the record before us whether P.W.’s due process rights were violated because of his seven-day ED boarding before his placement at PTRC. More importantly, nor was the trial judge. While we are skeptical of the merits of P.W.’s motion in the wake of the Supreme Judicial Court’s dicta about the unavoidable necessity of ED boarding in Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. C.R., we need not decide the merits of P.W.’s motion. Instead, we are tasked with determining whether the judge abused his discretion when he deemed P.W.’s motion to dismiss ‘waived’ because his attorney would not consent to a continuance or withdraw the motion.

“We start with the procedural posture of the case when the motion to dismiss came before the judge. As is often the case due to the time constraints imposed by G.L.c. 123, P.W. moved to dismiss the commitment petition on the morning of the hearing. PTRC’s counsel understandably objected. While PTRC’s counsel agreed that the motion could be heard that day, she objected to any expert witness testimony because there had been no timely disclosure. The judge offered to continue the hearing on P.W.’s motion so that PTRC’s counsel had sufficient time to prepare for the hearing and P.W.’s counsel had time to obtain the fruits of her pending discovery motion, i.e., ‘the records documenting PTRC’s search for an inpatient psychiatric treatment facility bed or ‘bed search’ conducted while [P.W.] was held in the ED.’

“To be sure, the judge was faced with a quandary. On the one hand, it is clear from the record before us that P.W.’s counsel refused to bend on the judge’s repeated offers for a continuance and his subsequent requests that she waive or withdraw the motion. Of note, the judge did not have the luxury of hearing the motion and taking it under advisement. … On the other hand, P.W.’s counsel insisted that the commitment hearing also go forward.

“A judge has virtually no discretion to commence a commitment hearing beyond the five-day deadline imposed by G.L.c. 123, §7(c). A judge’s discretion to continue a commitment hearing beyond the applicable deadline, either sua sponte or at the request of the petitioner, is limited to ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ which thus far has been limited to ‘a state of emergency at the federal or state level resulting in court closings or preventing the holding of a court session.’ … Considering a motion to dismiss is ‘not the sort of extraordinary circumstance justifying even a brief delay.’ … Faced with violating an inflexible deadline, which would have vitiated the court’s jurisdiction, the judge chose to hear the petition and deem the motion ‘waived.’ …

“… To determine what procedures are sufficient in a particular case, a court balances ‘the private interests protected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, the probable value of additional or substitute safeguards, and the governmental interests involved.’ Commonwealth v. Preston P., 483 Mass. 759, 767 (2020).

“As for ‘private interests’ affected, it is indisputable that P.W. had a significant liberty interest at stake in the motion to dismiss. If the motion was successful, it would have led to the dismissal of the petition and P.W.’s immediate discharge from PTRC. On the other hand, there was also a competing ‘government interest’ involved. Because PTRC’s medical director filed a petition to commit P.W., he or she presumptively had a good-faith basis to believe that P.W., if released into the community, posed a substantial risk of harm to himself or others. As P.W.’s motion to dismiss was potentially dispositive of the petition, PTRC’s counsel therefore was entitled to a reasonable amount of time to prepare for the hearing on the motion.

“Because we are satisfied that the judge carefully balanced these competing interests, we conclude that he did not abuse his discretion when he deemed the motion to dismiss ‘waived’ and heard the petition. Given the posture of the case when the motion was presented, we also decide that offering P.W.’s counsel a continuance so that the motion to dismiss could be properly vetted was the only viable option available to the judge.

“For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the judge’s decision to deem the motion to dismiss waived and thus affirm the commitment and medication treatment orders.”

In the Matter of P.W. (Lawyers Weekly No. 13-014-26) (9 pages) (Peterson, J.) (Western District) Orders entered by Pellegrini, J., in Worcester District Court. Julie Reardon and Erin F. Thron for the petitioner; Karen Owen Talley for the respondent (App. Div. No. 23-ADMH-49WE) (March 9, 2026).

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