Civil practice – Commitment

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Where a District Court judge granted a petition for involuntary civil commitment filed by Bridgewater State Hospital, the commitment order should be vacated because BSH failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent posed a likelihood of serious harm if not placed in the strict security of BSH.

“C.B. appeals from a decision and order of the Appellate Division of the District Court, which affirmed a District Court order granting a petition for involuntary civil commitment filed by Bridgewater State Hospital (BSH) pursuant to G.L.c. 123, §16 (b). C.B. contends that BSH failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (1) he would pose a ‘likelihood of serious harm’ if not placed in the strict security of BSH, G.L.c. 123, §8(b), and that (2) if he would pose such a risk, he ‘is not a proper subject for commitment’ to any other Department of Mental Health (DMH) facilities. C.B. also argues that BSH failed to prove that there is ‘no less restrictive alternative’ to the strict security at BSH. … We conclude that BSH failed to provide sufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that C.B. posed a likelihood of serious harm if not placed in the strict security of BSH, and therefore we reverse. …

“First, C.B. argues that BSH did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt he posed a ‘likelihood of serious harm’ if not confined to the strict security of BSH. G.L.c. 123, §8(b). … Upon review, we agree with C.B. and conclude that the evidence was insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that C.B. posed a ‘likelihood of serious harm.’ G.L.c. 123, §8(b).

“BSH primarily relied on Dr. Kelley’s expert testimony, credited by the judge hearing the petition, in establishing the ‘likelihood of serious harm.’ G.L.c. 123, §8(b). In her expert testimony, Dr. Kelley opined that failure to hospitalize C.B. at BSH ‘would create a serious risk of harm to others by reason of mental illness.’ The only basis in her testimony, however, for her conclusion that there was a risk of violence from C.B. was the fact that he had been charged with violent crimes. Her testimony about his mental health condition and its symptoms included information about delusion, suspiciousness, defensiveness, guardedness, persecutory thinking, a heightened sensitivity to threats, and that he was unnerved by discussion of certain topics. None of this, nor anything she testified was inherent to his diagnosis, provides any basis for concluding that C.B. presented any danger to others. Nor does the evidence of C.B.’s refusal to acknowledge or treat those symptoms provide such a basis.

“Rather, Dr. Kelley relied solely on the criminal charges against C.B. as evidence of C.B.’s violent behavior, and thus as evidence supporting her conclusion that C.B. presented a substantial risk of physical harm to others. Although criminal charges can be considered, such charges must be supported only by probable cause, see Commonwealth v. Stirlacci, 483 Mass. 775, 780 (2020); standing alone, in the absence of other evidence, they are insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt commission of the acts alleged. Where that is the only evidence of violence or even a risk of violence, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that ‘the failure to retain [C.B.] in strict custody would create a likelihood of serious harm.’ G.L.c. 123, §8(b). The problem is not, as BSH would have it, an absence of sufficient evidence of ‘recent overt acts of violence.’ It is the absence of sufficient evidence of violence altogether, or even a risk of violence.

“Because we conclude that BSH did not present sufficient evidence to show C.B. posed a ‘likelihood of serious harm,’ G.L.c. 123, §8(b), the decision and order of the Appellate Division is reversed. The order dated May 27, 2020, committing C.B. to BSH, is vacated.”

In the Matter of C.B. (Lawyers Weekly No. 81-040-26) (11 pages) (Docket No. 24-P-898) (April 15, 2026).

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