SJC offers clarification of SLAPP framework

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An abuse of process counterclaim should have been dismissed because the defendant did not meet its burden to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff’s lawsuit was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law, the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled.

The defendant asserted a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff abused process by filing suit. The plaintiff responded by filing a special motion to dismiss, pursuant to G.L.c. 231, §59H, arguing that the counterclaim targeted her for engaging in her constitutional right to petition the courts. A Superior Court judge denied the plaintiff’s motion. The motion judge agreed that the abuse of process counterclaim was based solely on the plaintiff’s act of petitioning the court, but concluded that the counterclaim need not be dismissed because the plaintiff’s lawsuit was devoid of any merit.

The plaintiff then appealed. An Appeals Court panel said it could not “conclude at this stage of the proceedings that the plaintiff’s claims lack any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law” as the “challenged claims in the lawsuit have not been resolved.”

On appeal, the SJC reversed the denial of the special motion to dismiss.

“In Bristol Asphalt Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Prods., Inc., 493 Mass. 539, 553 (2024) (Bristol Asphalt), this court significantly revised the framework for analyzing special motions to dismiss under our ‘anti-SLAPP‘ statute, G.L.c. 231, §59H, and provided an extensive discussion of how it should be properly applied. In the instant case, the analysis of both the motion judge and the Appeals Court deviated from that guidance, and we take this opportunity to clarify its proper application here,” Justice Scott L. Kafker wrote for the SJC.

“Regardless of whether [the plaintiff]’s lawsuit remains ongoing, it constitutes petitioning activity, and our anti-SLAPP statute explicitly provides that a counterclaim targeting that act of petitioning must be dismissed unless the petitioning activity ‘was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law.’ G.L.c. 231, §59H. As we explained in Bristol Asphalt, this presents a significant hurdle. However, that hurdle is not insurmountable, and we have provided guidance to litigants about the ways in which this standard can be, and has been, met in particular cases,” Kafker wrote.

“Here, the party who filed the abuse of process counterclaim, Harbor View, had the burden to make this showing in order to defeat [the plaintiff]’s special motion to dismiss the counterclaim. Because we conclude, unlike the motion judge, that Harbor View has not demonstrated that all of the claims raised in [the plaintiff]’s lawsuit are frivolous, Harbor View failed to meet this burden. In doing so, we arrive at the same conclusion as the Appeals Court panel, but apply the proper analysis. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court denying the special motion to dismiss,” he added.

The 32-page decision is Allegaert v. Harbor View Hotel Owner LLC, et al., Lawyers Weekly No. 10-030-26.

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.