Habeas corpus – Speedy trial

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Where a petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder by a Massachusetts jury, he is not entitled to habeas relief despite claiming a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

A U.S. District Court order denying the petition is affirmed.

“Three decades after a fatal shooting in a Boston park, petitioner Rodolfo Carr was convicted of first-degree murder by a Massachusetts jury and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this habeas case, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, Carr seeks dismissal of the indictment against him, claiming a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Carr also asserts an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, arguing that his trial and appellate attorneys failed to develop and present evidence crucial to his speedy-trial claim. After careful consideration of the record and caselaw — including our binding precedent on when the speedy-trial clock begins to run under federal law — we agree with the district court that Carr is not entitled to habeas relief. …

“… Carr alternatively argues that we should not treat the indictment as the trigger for the speedy-trial clock given the facts of this case. He argues that a ‘Wanted Poster’ naming him as a suspect, which was circulated shortly after the 1974 shooting, should be viewed in combination with the complaint to establish ‘the public, official accusation that the Sixth Amendment requires.’ …

“In sum, we see no rationale for concluding that the police circular changed the status of the prosecution against Carr such that the circumstances here fall outside the scope of Rashad [v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2002)] and Butler [v. Mitchell, 815 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2016)]. For the purpose of Carr’s habeas petition, therefore, the speedy-trial clock started in 1997, when he was detained and indicted for the murder charge. However, as we have recounted, Carr made no argument to the SJC — let alone to us — that the seven-year delay from indictment to trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. … Accordingly, any such claim is unequivocal. …

“In sum, even giving Carr the benefit of de novo review for his ineffective-assistance claims — the most favorable review available — those claims are unavailing. Accordingly, finding no basis for disturbing his conviction, we affirm the denial of Carr’s petition for habeas relief.”

Carr v. Lizotte (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-052-26) (28 pages) (Lipez, J.) Appealed from a decision by O’Toole, J., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Cathryn A. Neaves for the petitioner-appellant; Tara L. Johnston, with whom Andrea Joy Campbell was on brief, for the respondent-appellee (Docket No. 24-1715) (March 18, 2026).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.