Landlord and tenant – Assisted living residence – Intake fee

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Where a complaint was filed challenging a “community fee” charged by a defendant assisted living residence (ALR), the defendant should have been awarded summary judgment because the fee corresponds to the defendant’s provision of ALR-specific intake services to the members of the plaintiff class.

“We return in this appeal to the application of the security deposit statute, G.L.c. 186, §15B, to fees charged by an assisted living residence (ALR). We first considered the application of the security deposit statute to ALRs in Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 Mass. 612 (2019) (Ryan I). That appeal followed the dismissal of the class action complaint in this case alleging that the defendant ALR violated the security deposit statute and thereby also violated G.L.c. 93A. The complaint challenged the defendant’s practice of charging incoming residents a ‘community fee’ that the complaint alleged did not fall within the four categories of fees an incoming tenant may be charged under G.L.c. 186, §15B(1)(b). The judge dismissed the complaint on the ground that the security deposit statute was entirely inapplicable to ALRs, which are subject to their own regulatory scheme set forth in the ALR statute, G.L.c. 19D.

“In Ryan I, 483 Mass. at 622-628, we concluded that the security deposit statute and ALR statute could be read in harmony to effectuate the Legislature’s purposes in both statutes. We held that the security deposit statute does apply to ALRs as lessors of residential property, … but does not restrict ALRs when they ‘charge incoming residents initial fees that correspond to initial ALR-specific services inapplicable to ordinary landlord-tenant relationships.’ …

“Based on the limited record before us in Ryan I, 483 Mass. at 613-614, we reversed the order dismissing the complaint and remanded the case to the Superior Court for further factual development regarding whether the disputed community fee corresponded to ALR-specific intake services. Following discovery and certification of a plaintiff class, the parties each moved for summary judgment. A Superior Court judge allowed the plaintiffs’ motion and denied the defendant’s motion, and the defendant appealed. Before this court, the parties both contend that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and that they each are entitled to summary judgment.

“We conclude that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on uncontradicted evidence in the record establishing that the community fees charged by the defendant correspond to the defendant’s provision of ALR-specific intake services to the members of the plaintiff class. We therefore reverse the judge’s order as to both motions for summary judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court for entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.”

Ryan v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-025-26) (28 pages) (Dewar, J.) The case was heard by Maureen Mulligan, J., on motions for summary judgment, and entry of judgment was ordered by Brent A. Tingle, J., in Superior Court. AiVi Nguyen (Brian J. Edmonds also present) for the defendant; Joshua N. Garick (Matthew T. LaMothe also present) for the plaintiff; the following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Kevin W. Buono for Massachusetts Assisted Living Association; Andrea Joy Campbell and Andrew C. Musgrave for the Massachusetts attorney general; Mark A. Aronsson, Derek M. Gillis and Kevin W. Buono for Tewksbury Living Group, LLC, and others; Sam Wehrle, Kelly Bagby, Eric Carlson, Lindsay Mitnik, John J. Ford, Richard M.W. Bauer, Liane Zeitz and Stuart T. Rossman for AARP and others (Docket No. SJC-13726) (March 13, 2026).

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