Criminal – Psychiatric examination

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Where (1) a defendant who moved for resentencing retained an expert who conducted a psychological examination and provided a report to the commonwealth based on that examination, (2) the commonwealth then moved for a reciprocal court-ordered psychiatric examination by its own expert, and (3) after a Superior Court judge allowed the commonwealth’s motion, the defendant filed a petition seeking relief from that order, a single justice’s denial of the defendant’s petition should be affirmed because fundamental fairness and accurate fact-finding warranted affording the commonwealth’s expert a meaningful opportunity to evaluate the same subject matter underlying the defendant’s expert opinion.

“This case presents a narrow question: whether, in postconviction resentencing proceedings under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) (rule 30), a judge may permit limited discovery in the form of a court-ordered psychiatric examination of a defendant who elects to rely on expert opinion derived from a personal examination.

“The defendant was convicted of several nonmurder offenses committed as an emerging adult. He received an aggregate State prison sentence requiring at least thirty-one years of incarceration before parole eligibility, which exceeds the parole eligibility that is now applicable to emerging adult offenders convicted of murder in the first degree. See Commonwealth v. Mattis, 493 Mass. 216, 237 (2024). Relying on Mattis, the defendant moved for resentencing under rule 30, asserting that his sentence violates art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

“In preparation for the resentencing hearing, the defendant retained an expert who conducted a psychological examination and provided a report to the Commonwealth based on that examination. The Commonwealth then moved for a reciprocal court-ordered psychiatric examination by its own expert, which a Superior Court judge (motion judge) allowed. The examination authorized by the motion judge was expressly premised on the judge’s expectation that the defendant would present expert testimony at the resentencing hearing regarding his own expert’s recent psychological evaluation of the defendant. Before the court-ordered examination occurred, the defendant filed a petition in the county court seeking relief from that order. A single justice denied the petition, and the defendant appealed.

“For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the single justice did not err or abuse her discretion in denying relief. The judgment of the single justice is therefore affirmed. …

“Once a prima facie showing is made, rule 30 authorizes a judge to permit appropriate discovery on ‘motion of any party,’ including the Commonwealth (emphasis added). Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(c)(4). Although postconviction discovery often is sought by defendants to develop evidence otherwise ‘unknown to the court’ to support ‘an apparently meritorious claim’ (citation omitted), Commonwealth v. Daniels, 445 Mass. 392, 406 (2005), permitting appropriate discovery by the Commonwealth ensures that resentencing decisions rest on accurate and complete information, see Commonwealth v. Plasse, 481 Mass. 199, 206 (2019).

“Where, as here, the defendant relies on expert opinion grounded substantially in recent personal interviews and clinical judgment concerning his mental state and rehabilitation, permitting the Commonwealth to obtain a corresponding psychiatric examination serves that purpose. Such reciprocity helps ensure that the sentencing judge is not presented with a one-sided expert narrative that cannot be meaningfully tested through cross-examination alone. …

“The Commonwealth is not entitled to parity for its own sake. Rather, the motion judge permissibly concluded that fundamental fairness and accurate fact finding warranted affording the Commonwealth’s expert a meaningful opportunity to evaluate the same subject matter underlying the defendant’s expert opinion. That determination reflects the practical reality that expert conclusions derived from recent clinical interviews and professional judgment concerning a defendant’s mental condition and rehabilitation cannot always be fully assessed through documentary evidence or cross-examination alone.

“Our holding is limited. We do not suggest that a psychiatric examination is warranted whenever a defendant seeks resentencing or introduces generalized mitigation evidence. Instead, a motion judge acts within his or her discretion where, as here, the defendant’s expert opinion rests substantially on personal interviews and clinical assessment addressing the defendant’s psychological functioning — a matter not readily susceptible to meaningful assessment without comparable evaluation. …

“Resentencing proceedings, like original sentencing hearings, permit consideration of a broad range of information bearing on the defendant’s characteristics, background, and prospects for rehabilitation. … Where a defendant elects to present mental health evidence derived from a personal examination, allowing a limited reciprocal evaluation serves the societal interest of ensuring a ‘fair inquiry’ into this critical issue (citation omitted). …

“Here, the motion judge did not abuse her discretion or otherwise err in permitting the Commonwealth to obtain a psychiatric examination where there was a reasonable likelihood that the defendant would rely on psychological expert testimony derived from his own statements. The single justice likewise did not abuse her discretion or err in denying the defendant’s petition.”

Berry v. Commonwealth (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-024-26) (17 pages) (Georges, J.) The case was heard by Wendlandt, J., sitting as single justice. Elizabeth Caddick for the petitioner; Elisabeth Martino for the commonwealth (Docket No. SJC-13789) (March 12, 2026).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.