Education – Corporal punishment

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Where a substantive due process claim has been brought against a defendant teacher, his motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds should be denied because the complaint adequately pleads a conscience-shocking violation of the plaintiff student’s right to be free from excessive corporal punishment, a right that was clearly established at the time of the teacher’s alleged misconduct.

“Plaintiffs Jayron Torquis Yac (‘Jayron’), Rosa Yac Gomez, and Thomas Torquis brought suit against Defendants City of New Bedford, Whaling City Junior/Senior High School (‘Whaling City School’), and Joseph Kazen (together, ‘Defendants’) after Kazen allegedly injured Jayron at Whaling City School. …

“… On or about January 10, 2023, Jayron was in his homeroom classroom. … Kazen ‘tackle[d] or cause[d] [Jayron] to fall to the ground,’ … in retaliation ‘for a trivial classroom infraction.’ … As a result, Jayron fractured his right arm, necessitating two surgeries, and spent the rest of his senior year at home. … Jayron graduated without returning to Whaling City School. …

“At the hearing before this Court, Municipal Defendants conceded that Plaintiffs complied with the presentment requirements of the MTCA and that dismissal of Counts I, IV, and V on that ground is not warranted. … Conversely, Plaintiffs conceded that Count I must be dismissed as against Whaling City School because it is not a separate entity from New Bedford. ‘Under Massachusetts law, a town is not and cannot be deemed an entity separate and independent from any of its constituent departments, and a suit against a department is deemed to be a suit against the Town itself.’ … Accordingly Count I is dismissed only as to Whaling City School. …

“Plaintiffs brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Kazen in his individual capacity, alleging that Kazen violated Jayron’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. …

“Kazen argues that Count II should be dismissed because he is entitled to qualified immunity. …

“This Court turns first to whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct. … The Supreme Court has recognized that Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests are implicated ‘where school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately decide to punish a child for misconduct by . . . inflicting appreciable physical pain.’ Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977). A number of circuit courts have held, accordingly, that ‘excessive corporal punishment can violate a student’s substantive due process rights.’ … ‘While the First Circuit has not considered this precise issue, it has stated that a consensus of three or more circuits can ‘clearly establish’ a right.’ … The right to be free from excessive corporal punishment was therefore ‘well established’ at the time of Kazen’s alleged misconduct. …

“The Court next considers whether the facts alleged sufficiently shock the conscience and therefore state a claim for a substantive due process violation. … Here, Plaintiffs allege that Kazen ‘retaliated against [Jayron] for a trivial classroom infraction,’ … by ‘tackl[ing] or caus[ing] [Jayron] to fall to the ground’ such that Jayron ‘sustained a right arm fracture requiring two surgeries’ and was unable to return to school for the remainder of the year. … Another court in this District has found that similar injuries from a teacher can constitute misconduct shocking to the conscience. … Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have, at this stage, adequately pled a conscience-shocking violation of Jayron’s right to be free from excessive corporal punishment and that Kazen is not entitled to qualified immunity. …

“Plaintiffs allege that New Bedford’s policies include ‘failure to discipline teachers for inappropriate physical contact, failure to train staff in de-escalation and student safety and tacit approval of physical force,’ … and that New Bedford ‘had notice of prior misconduct by Mr. Kazen and failed to take corrective action.’ … A municipality’s failure to adequately train its employees may give rise to section 1983 liability in limited circumstances. … Here, Plaintiffs allege that New Bedford was aware of and failed to address prior misconduct by Kazen, and expressly link New Bedford’s ‘failure to discipline’ and ‘tacit approval of physical force’ to Jayron’s injuries, which were inflicted by the very individual whose prior misconduct New Bedford allegedly ignored. … At this stage, in which the Court ‘must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs,’ … and the plaintiff need only ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’ … the allegations in Count III are sufficient to survive Municipal Defendants’ motion to dismiss. …

“Jayron’s parents each bring claims for loss of consortium of their son against Defendants. … Defendants argue that parental loss of consortium claims may only be brought against a ‘person,’ not against a municipality or municipal employees, and therefore these claims must be dismissed. …

“… For the reasons articulated in Doe I [v. City of Northampton, 659 F. Supp. 3d 122 (D. Mass. 2023)], Plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claims may be brought against Municipal Defendants.

“Plaintiffs conceded at the hearing, however, that the loss of consortium claims must be dismissed as against Kazen because a parental loss of consortium requires an ‘underlying tortious act.’ … Other alleged misconduct, including section 1983 claims, cannot provide the basis for a loss of consortium claim. … Accordingly, Counts IV and V are dismissed as against Kazen. Counts IV and V survive, however, as against Municipal Defendants, against whom Plaintiffs also make a claim of negligence under the MTCA. …

“For the foregoing reasons, Municipal Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and Kazen’s motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.”

Yac v. Whaling City Junior/Senior High School, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-106-26) (9 pages) (Murphy, J.) (Civil Action No. 25-13089-BEM) (Feb. 27, 2026).

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