Real property – Trespass

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Where summary judgment was awarded to plaintiffs who claimed trespass, a motion by the defendant to vacate that judgment should be denied despite her assertion that jurisdiction is lacking and that the plaintiffs no longer have standing now that they have sold their condominium unit.

“At the time the complaint was filed in 2015, plaintiffs owned Unit 1E, and Ms. Ferraz owned Unit 1A within the condominium complex known as The Hadley Street Condominium (‘the Condominium’), which consists of six attached townhouse units along Hadley and Crescent Streets in Charlestown. …

“In her motion, [defendant Susan] Ferraz argues that the Land Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ trespass claims, which she contends sounded entirely in tort. She further argues the judgment should be set aside because plaintiffs sold Unit 1E and thus, they no longer have standing to enforce the judgment. …

“However, Ms. Ferraz is not correct in her assertion that plaintiffs’ claims in this action sounded entirely in tort. …

“Moreover, the Land Court has long asserted jurisdiction over trespass claims which include ancillary claims for damages. … This is because, unlike many forms of tort claims, damages are not an essential element of a trespass claim, … and instead, the title issue is dispositive of the trespass claim. … Accordingly, and as authorized pursuant to G.L.c. 185, §1(o), this court has jurisdiction over trespass claims where title to real property is in dispute, even when ancillary claims for damages are included in the complaint. …

“… Accordingly, this court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ claims (as well as Ms. Ferraz’s defenses) pursuant to G.L.c. 185, §1(o), and it declines to vacate the judgment on those grounds. …

“Ms. Ferraz next contends the judgment ‘can no longer be sustained’ because plaintiffs sold their unit in October of 2016, and thus can no longer enforce the judgment because they lack standing. She argues the judgment’s ‘continued enforcement would expose [her] to improper claims by individuals lacking a legally cognizable interest.’

“In making these arguments, Ms. Ferraz appears to conflate the concept of standing, which is examined at the time the lawsuit is filed and while it is pending, with the concept of res judicata, the doctrine which applies to determine whether a prior judgment is binding in future actions. …

“Significantly, there is currently no party before the court other than Ms. Ferraz. Plaintiffs are not before the court seeking to enforce the judgment, nor are their successors in title. In fact, there is no party currently seeking to enforce the judgment. Rather, Ms. Ferraz appears before the court speculating that, in the future, some party ‘lacking a legally cognizable interest’ might come forward to enforce the judgment and, for this reason, it should be vacated. Such speculative claims are not ripe for the court’s consideration, nor can they serve as a basis to set aside the judgment.

“If, at some time in the future, a party comes forward seeking to enforce the judgment against Ms. Ferraz, the court will be required at that time to consider the question as to that party’s standing, as well as to address whether the res judicata concepts of claim and/or issue preclusion prevent the re-litigation of any of the issues addressed in the prior judgment. Presently, however, any such future scenario is purely speculative and cannot serve as grounds to set aside the judgment, which is entitled to finality. …

“For all these reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Judgment as Void Pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) is denied.”

McNamara, et al. v. Ferraz (Lawyers Weekly No. 14-011-26) (11 pages) (Turano-Flores, J.) (Suffolk Land Court) (Docket No. 15 MISC 000048) (Jan. 23, 2026).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.