Employment – Vaccination – Religious discrimination

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Where a U.S. District Court judge dismissed claims brought by two plaintiffs who were denied religious exemptions from the defendant employer’s COVID-19 vaccination policy, the dismissals should be vacated because the plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims of retaliation and religious discrimination.

“This is an appeal from the dismissal of retaliation and discrimination claims brought by two former employees of Hasbro, Inc., the global toy and game company. These former employees sought exemptions from Hasbro’s COVID-19 vaccination policy on religious grounds and then, after not receiving the requested exemptions, resigned their employment. We vacate the dismissals and remand for further proceedings. …

“After the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, we decided Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc., 113 F.4th 9 (1st Cir. 2024) and Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc., 126 F.4th 76 (1st Cir. 2025). …

“Hasbro properly does not urge us to affirm the district court’s dismissal order based on its conclusion that the plaintiffs’ refusal to take the COVID-19 vaccine was based on something other than a religious belief. As we explained in Bazinet, the fact that the plaintiffs’ opposition to abortion may have a moral component or may be held by others solely for moral reasons does not mean that, for these plaintiffs, the position lacks a religious character. … And, as we explained in Thornton, ‘my-body-is-my-temple arguments rooted in a plaintiff’s religious beliefs are sufficient to plead the existence of a bona fide religious belief’ for the purposes of Title VII. Thornton, 126 F.4th at 83-84 (collecting cases). The plaintiffs here sufficiently alleged that their opposition to taking the COVID-19 vaccine was based on a comprehensive system of religious belief. No more is required at this stage. …

“We are left then to consider whether we may affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ retaliation and discrimination claims on the alternate grounds provided by the district court or, as Hasbro urges, for another basis apparent from the record. …

“Respecting the adverse actions allegedly taken by Hasbro, the amended complaint states that, after the plaintiffs requested an accommodation from Hasbro’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement, they received warnings based on alleged violations of company policy that had occurred months earlier; that these warnings precluded their advancement within the company, including, as to [Jennifer] DeAngelis, by disqualifying her from a previously promised promotion and, as to [Natalie] Tomaselli, by removing her from consideration for two available promotions; and that, by the time DeAngelis returned from leave, her job had been given to someone else. Various other allegations — such as the removal of Tomaselli from internal organizational charts while she was on leave; her assignment to events requiring vaccination; the dissemination of the plaintiffs’ medical information to coworkers; and the company’s new practice of reviewing the plaintiffs’ vacation requests — add color to what is at its core a story of Hasbro’s reprisals resulting in the plaintiffs’ marginalization within the company. …

“… For now, the important point is that the allegations in the complaint possess sufficient ‘cumulative weight’ to ‘plausibly paint a picture that would allow a factfinder to find [Hasbro’s] conduct sufficient to deter a reasonable person’ from engaging in protected conduct had they known what would result. …

“That leaves causation, and here, too, the amended complaint demonstrates plausibility. … To start, the complaint’s chronology suggests retaliation. …

“And here, the causal inference arising from temporal proximity is stronger when Hasbro’s alleged actions are viewed in context. …

“The plausibility of a causal link between the plaintiffs’ protected conduct and the warnings issued by Hasbro also bolsters an inference that the company’s other, later actions were connected to the plaintiffs’ protected conduct. …

“It bears emphasis that retaliation is not the only possible explanation for Hasbro’s actions. And the plaintiffs have not yet proven any of the facts alleged. But, at this stage, they need not establish the truth of their allegations or that a retaliatory inference is most probable. … The plaintiffs were only required to plead facts showing that their retaliation claims are plausible, and they have done so. …

“For the reasons discussed, the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’ retaliation claims. …

“Although the plaintiffs’ religious discrimination claims present a closer question, we likewise conclude that their dismissal was unwarranted. …

“… Hasbro’s failure to select the plaintiffs for certain promotions and its giving of DeAngelis’s job to a new hire while she was on leave are substantially like the sorts of actions that may serve as predicates for a viable Title VII discrimination claim. … And the allegations in the amended complaint concerning these incidents, while not robust, are not so ‘threadbare’ that they must be discarded as conclusory. … The amended complaint identified specific promotions denied to the plaintiffs, even if it did not say much about them, and alleged that DeAngelis’s position was taken away from her, even though she could have offered more details about her subsequent responsibilities.

“The plaintiffs’ allegations regarding promotion and reassignment are sufficient to establish an adverse employment action. If certain allegations, as developed and contextualized by discovery, are insufficient to constitute adverse actions, the plaintiffs’ discrimination claims, like their retaliation claims, may be pared down accordingly at summary judgment. …

“Thus, for reasons similar to those provided for the retaliation claims, we conclude that, based on (1) Hasbro’s initial delay in enforcing company policy; (2) the temporal proximity of the plaintiffs’ disclosure of their particular religious beliefs to the alleged adverse employment action based on the claimed policy violation; and (3) the arguably disproportionate nature of the punishment for the violation, the plaintiffs have plausibly pleaded that they suffered actionable religious discrimination. … And nothing in the complaint indicates that Hasbro has asserted another basis for its actions, which would provide an obvious non-discriminatory explanation for its conduct. …

“Because the plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims of retaliation and religious discrimination, we vacate the order dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under Title VII, the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, and the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to the plaintiffs.”

DeAngelis, et al. v. Hasbro, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-021-26) (28 pages) (Aframe, J.) Appealed from a decision by McElroy, J., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Stephen T. Fanning for the plaintiffs-appellants; Leslie D. Parker, with whom Patricia K. Rocha, Christoper J. Yagoobian and Adler Pollock & Sheehan were on brief, for the defendant-appellee (Docket No. 24-1655) (Jan. 29, 2026).

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