Truck-driving instructor not entitled to overtime pay

Listen to this article

An instructor at a commercial truck-driving school was not entitled to overtime pay under the Wage Act, a Superior Court judge has determined.

Plaintiff Jasminko Cerkezovic worked as a commercial driving license, or CDL, instructor for defendant New England Tractor Trailer Training of Mass., Inc., a for-profit truck-driving school.

He argued in a Wage Act claim that G.L.c. 151, §1A(17) — a provision in the statute that specifically exempts employees of a “non-profit school or college” from receiving overtime pay — evinced a legislative intent that employees at for-profit schools be protected by the statute’s overtime provisions.

But Judge William F. Bloomer disagreed.

In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Bloomer emphasized that §1A(3) of the Wage Act exempts “bona fide professionals” from overtime pay; that the Code of Massachusetts regulations states that the definition of “bona fide professional” shall be the same as it is under the Code of Federal Regulations; and that the relevant federal regulation includes “teachers engaged in automobile driving instruction” as bona fide professionals.

Section 1A(17) “is an entirely separate exemption from § 1A(3) … and Cerkezovic’s interpretation would require this court to graft the two independent sections together, something the legislature could easily have done but did not,” Bloomer wrote.

The six-page decision is Cerkezovic v. New England Tractor Trailer Training of Mass., Inc., Lawyers Weekly No. 12-058-25.

Following the case law?

The driving school’s attorney, Caitlin A. Romasco of Boston, said the judge correctly applied the Massachusetts overtime statute and its incorporation of definitions from the federal regulations in concluding that Cerkezovic counted as an exempt teaching professional.

“We have quite a few cases, both Appeals Court and Supreme Judicial Court cases, that talk about how [overtime provisions] in the Massachusetts Wage Act are intended to mirror or be the same as the federal equivalent,” Romasco said. “This case is important because it follows that case law.”

Dracut attorney George C. Malonis, who represented the plaintiff, said that while he understood the judge’s decision based on the law as it is written, he believes the Legislature intended to provide coverage in a situation such as his client’s.

“The judge took a lot of time in writing the decision and I certainly appreciate that, but in looking at the overall scheme of things, I believe the statute could have been alternatively interpreted to provide overtime benefits to my client and others situated similarly,” Malonis said.

We have quite a few Appeals Court and Supreme Judicial Court cases that talk about how [OT provisions] in the Massachusetts Wage Act are intended to mirror or be the same as the federal equivalent. This case is important because it follows that case law.

— Caitlin A. Romasco, Boston

He also noted that there is little Massachusetts case law on the issue of whether instructors such as his client are protected by the Wage Act’s overtime provisions.

“The decision cited a [federal case] from Maryland,” he said. “But Massachusetts is a different animal, and if you look at the case law, the Massachusetts wage law is designed to cover people not covered by federal wage law.”

Raven Moeslinger, a Boston attorney who represents workers in wage-and-hour disputes, said the plaintiff faced an uphill climb from the start, since he alleged that he was an instructor at a school.

“It’s hard to avoid the teacher overtime exemption on those facts,” he said.

Moeslinger added that while the plaintiff suggested in his opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss that he fell outside the exemption because he performed a substantial amount of non-instructional work, that was not alleged in his complaint and it is unlikely that discovery would show his primary duty was not teaching.

Regardless, Moeslinger described it as “shameful” that the exemption exists.

“It allows both hourly and salaried teachers to work unlimited hours without receiving a penny of overtime pay,” he said. “It serves no legitimate policy goal and deserves a legislative fix.”

Elijah Bresley of Boston said the decision serves as a reminder that attorneys who handle Wage Act cases should be mindful of Fair Labor Standards Act interpretation, particularly when federal regulation constricts Massachusetts law, including the award of automatic treble damages for all Wage Act violations.

“Although the Wage Act is seen as more employee-proactive than the FLSA, courts often look to federal guidance, which can effectively narrow employees’ remedies,” he said.

Alleged overtime violations

The plaintiff worked for NETTT from Jan. 27, 2020, until his termination on March 12, 2025.

He worked as a CDL instructor and eventually was promoted to lead CDL instructor.

The plaintiff alleges that during the course of his employment with the company, he never received overtime pay.

He also asserts that between December 2022 and March 2025, there were 89 weeks in which he worked more than 40 hours. In total, the plaintiff claims he worked 1,451.33 hours of overtime, for which he never received time-and-a-half pay.

According to the plaintiff’s pay rate, the difference between his regular rate and the time-and-a-half overtime rate for his alleged overtime hours amounted to $17,988.

He also stated in his July 3, 2024, Superior Court complaint that, with treble damages as permitted under the Wage Act, the figure would come to $53,964.

The plaintiff further claimed damages for emotional distress.

The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that, as a teaching professional, the plaintiff was a “bona fide professional” exempt from overtime under §1A(3) of the Wage Act.

In opposition, the plaintiff cited §1A(17) of the Wage Act, which exempts from overtime any worker employed in a nonprofit school or college.

Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that given the lack of any similar express provision for employees of for-profit schools or colleges, the Legislature clearly intended for such employees to be eligible for overtime under the Wage Act.

The plaintiff further noted that as lead CDL instructor, a significant portion of his activities involved coordination of schedules and cleaning vehicles and the defendant’s facility, none of which involved direct educational or professional activities.

‘Cutting and pasting’

Bloomer determined that the plaintiff counted as a “bona fide professional person” exempt from overtime under §1A(3).

In drawing that conclusion, he looked to Section 27.03(3) of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations, which states that the terms “bona fide executive, or administrative or professional person” under the Wage Act carry the same meanings set forth in Part 541 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Bloomer also noted Part 541’s express language that “[e]xempt teachers include but are not limited to … teachers engaged in automobile driving instruction.”

The judge then looked to Gonzalez v. New Eng. Tractor Trailer Train. School, a 1996 decision from Maryland as persuasive authority that Cerkezovic was not entitled to overtime.

In that case, a federal District Court judge concluded that instructors for NETTT were teachers who were “professionals” within the meaning of the FLSA and thus exempt from the FLSA’s overtime provisions.

“This court reaches the same conclusion under the Wage Act,” Bloomer said. “As a CDL Instructor and Lead CDL Instructor at a tractor trailer training school earning more than $80 per week, Cerkezovic falls within exemption § 1A(3) of the overtime pay requirement.”

Bloomer rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because §1A(17) of the Wage Act exempted employees of nonprofit schools from overtime protections, that meant that employees of for-profit schools were meant to be protected.

The judge explained that adopting the plaintiff’s position would require him to graft together §1A(3), which exempts teaching professionals, and §1A(17), which exempts employees of nonprofit schools.

Such “cutting and pasting” of different Wage Act provisions would lead to absurd results, he said.

“For example, if one were to read together § 1A(6) and § 1A(13), it would exempt a fisherman who plies his/her trade in a gasoline station from the overtime pay requirement,” Bloomer said.

For those reasons, Bloomer concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.