Landlord and tenant – Claim preclusion – MCAD dismissal

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Where a Housing Court judge dismissed a tenant’s complaint on the basis of claim preclusion, that was error, as the tenant’s action is not precluded merely because the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination previously dismissed her complaint alleging the same underlying facts.

Reversed and remanded.

“Ainsley Morecroft sued her former landlord, CPF Taylor Pond, LLC (landlord), for violations of anti-discrimination and fair housing laws. The Housing Court dismissed the complaint on the basis of claim preclusion. …

“Morecroft lived in a property owned by the landlord from 2017 until around April 2023. Throughout 2022, Morecroft made several requests for reasonable accommodations, which the landlord denied after deciding that they were not based on a disability-related need. In December 2022, the landlord served Morecroft with a thirty-day notice to quit for alleged lease violations; Morecroft asserts that the eviction was in retaliation for her accommodation requests.

“Thereafter, Morecroft filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD). The MCAD dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause; Morecroft sought review of the determination pursuant to 804 Code Mass. Regs. §1.08(4)(b) (2020), and the investigating commissioner affirmed the dismissal.

“Morecroft then filed this action in Housing Court. …

“The landlord subsequently moved to dismiss, arguing that the MCAD dismissal precluded the civil action. After a hearing, a second judge allowed the motion. …

“The landlord does not explain why the MCAD’s dismissal for lack of probable cause qualifies as a final judgment on the merits or cite any authority so stating. Rather, the landlord argues that Morecroft may choose between filing an MCAD complaint or a civil action, but may not do both, citing King v. First, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373 n.2 (1999). But the landlord’s cited footnote merely states that G.L.c. 151B, §9, was amended in 1991 ‘to permit a plaintiff alleging housing discrimination to commence a civil action … without first filing a complaint with the MCAD.’ … King did not state that the amendment created an exclusive choice between the two avenues of relief. …

“… Therefore, Morecroft’s present action is not precluded merely because the MCAD dismissed, and later affirmed the dismissal of, her complaint alleging the same underlying facts. …

“The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.”

Morecroft v. CPF Taylor Pond, LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 81-154-25) (6 pages) (Docket No. 24-P-1210) (Nov. 20, 2025).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.