Judge had power to vacate own ruling sua sponte

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A state District Court judge had the authority to vacate, sua sponte, his earlier summary judgment for the defendant in a consumer protection case, the Appeals Court has ruled in a case of first impression.

Plaintiff Josh Anyaosah brought fraud, misrepresentation and Chapter 93A claims in Brookline District Court against defendant Copart of Connecticut, which hosts an online vehicle auction, for selling him a car that did not run.

The District Court judge initially granted summary judgment to the defendant, but 56 days later, following the plaintiff’s notice of appeal, he vacated the judgment and restored the case to the docket.

The defendant argued on appeal that, under Rule 60(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, a judge can only vacate an earlier decision on a formal motion by a party.

The Appeals Court found otherwise.

“A majority of Federal circuit courts — the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth — have held that ‘Rule 60 (b)’s “on motion” language does not necessarily deprive the court of the power to act in the interest of justice in an unusual case in which its attention has been directed to the necessity for relief by means other than a motion,’” Judge Chauncey B. Wood wrote for the Appeals Court panel. “The majority’s position holds sway here.”

The panel also rejected the defendant’s argument that the District Court did not vacate its judgment within a reasonable time as required by Rule 60(b).

Meanwhile, the panel found that because the defendant opted not to provide transcripts from the hearings at which the District Court allowed summary judgment and vacated it, there was an insufficient record to address the defendant’s claim that the District Court did not provide the parties adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before taking action.

The 10-page decision is Anyaosah v. Copart of Connecticut, Inc., Lawyers Weekly No. 11-075-25.

‘Preserving institutional integrity’

Plaintiff’s counsel Jay Odunukwe of Boston said his client had a meritorious case that was unjustly dismissed, and both the District Court and the Appeals Court realized that the plaintiff’s claims should be heard.

Odunukwe added that the decision goes a long way toward preserving the institutional integrity of the court.

“It would be contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of mere technicalities,” he said. “[The ruling] strengthens a court’s equitable authority to give relief to judgments when appropriate.”

Boston attorney Warren D. Hutchison, who represented the defendant, could not be reached for comment.

However, civil litigator Thomas R. Murphy said it was a good decision.

The defendant argued that because Rule 60(b) uses the term “on motion,” that meant “on motion from a party, not a judge,” Murphy said.

“The problem with that argument is that had [the drafters of the rule] wanted that to be the case, they would have put ‘from a party’ in the rule,” the Salem lawyer added. “When they write these rules, it’s not just on the back of a beverage napkin at the bar. There are comments submitted, they go through drafts, and if they wanted to include the term ‘from a party,’ they would have added it.”

Newton litigator Andrea C. Kramer said the decision strikes a balance between efficient, predictable practice and doing justice.

“These days, the Massachusetts appellate courts are leaning toward doing justice, and personally I believe that’s right,” she said.

Eric P. Magnuson of Boston said a contrary ruling would “enbalm errors” even when the court that erred wanted to unwind its mistake.

“There’s no good reason to interpret Rule 60(b) in a way that deprives courts, in their service of justice, of the power to repair that which they have done,” he said.

Marc G. Perlin, professor emeritus at Suffolk University Law School, emphasized that even if a judge decides to act sua sponte in vacating a judgment, that does not mean the judge can unilaterally do so without notifying the parties in advance and providing them an opportunity to be heard on the matter — an issue raised by the defendant but which the Appeals Court did not address because of what it deemed an inadequate trial court record.

There’s no good reason to interpret Rule 60(b) in a way that deprives courts, in their service of justice, of the power to repair that which they have done.

— Eric P. Magnuson, Boston

“It seems to me that the parties ought to be given the opportunity to address the matter before the judgment is vacated by the judge,” Perlin said.

Northampton attorney Mark A. Tanner suggested that the biggest takeaway from the decision is that a party bringing an appeal needs to order transcripts.

“If you don’t, the appellate court has a lot of leeway to do what it wants,” he said. “If they have the transcripts, they have to look and see what was done at the hearing instead of giving the judge the benefit of the doubt. Just speculating, but my suspicion is that [the defense] didn’t order the transcript because it wasn’t favorable to them.”

Sua sponte action

The plaintiff purchased a used car in an online auction hosted by the defendant, allegedly based on representations on the defendant’s auction site that the car “Run[s] and Drive[s]” and had “normal wear.”

Before participating in the auction, the plaintiff registered online and agreed to an extensive list of terms and conditions, including a provision that once a vehicle is removed from the defendant’s premises, it is accepted “as-is” and “under no circumstances” would the defendant be liable for any subsequent claims of damage or loss of any type.

On Jan. 18, 2022, after submitting the highest bid, the plaintiff paid the defendant in full for the car.

Ten days later, an employee of the defendant emailed the plaintiff saying, “This vehicle has arrived at our facility. It does not run/drive as advertised. Please let me know if you’d like us to reverse this sale.”

The plaintiff apparently read only the first line stating that the vehicle had arrived at the defendant’s facility. Not reading the rest of the email, he responded: “Will send a driver to pick it up.” He then arranged for a tow truck to pick up the car and deliver it to him.

The tow truck driver subsequently informed the plaintiff that the car did not run. The plaintiff also discovered damage to the seats and, apparently, the car frame.

When the plaintiff demanded a refund, the defendant refused, citing the terms and conditions.

The plaintiff then sued the defendant in District Court, alleging fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and violation of Chapter 93A.

After a hearing on Aug. 25, 2022, Judge Maurice R. Flynn III granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, which he treated as a summary judgment motion, in a margin endorsement ruling: “Allowed after hearing. The [plaintiff] agreed to purchase vehicle even after [defendant] told him that it did not run.”

After judgment entered, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, leading to a hearing on Oct. 20, 2022, at which Flynn reconsidered his summary judgment and vacated it, restoring the case to the docket.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division without presenting a transcript from the Oct. 20 hearing but arguing that, at the hearing, Flynn stated he had “made a mistake” in dismissing the complaint.

The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, and the defendant sought further review in the Appeals Court.

The record appendix the defendant filed did not include a transcript of either the Aug. 25 or Oct. 20 hearing.

The defendant certified that it did not intend to order a transcript and apparently did not do so.

Interests of justice

The Appeals Court rejected the defendant’s argument that Rule 60(b) gives a judge no authority to vacate a decision sua sponte.

Instead, looking to a majority of federal circuits, the court found that a judge has the power to act in the interest of justice.

“‘Mistakes can easily slip in, and work great injustice,’” Wood wrote, directly quoting the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals’ 1999 Kingsvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lake Alice Bar decision. “‘Justice is better served by letting a judge repair mistakes … in the fortunate circumstances where the judge happens to notice them.’”

Meanwhile, the Appeals Court panel declined to rule on whether the District Court provided the parties with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, given what it described as an inadequate record.

“As we have explained, we accept the parties’ representation that the judge vacated the judgment sua sponte and that he did so ‘to correct what he perceive[d] to be a “mistake” in [his] prior order,’” Wood wrote. “Even making these assumptions, however, we cannot discern, from this record, any basis for the claim that the parties lacked adequate opportunity to be heard on the issue. Accordingly, even if the defendant’s claim goes to the judge’s power to grant relief rather than the merits of his exercise of discretion — an issue we do not decide — the claim would be waived.”