Constitutional – Animal cruelty statute – Commerce Clause

Listen to this article

Where a U.S. District Court judge rejected a challenge to the validity of a state statute prohibiting the use of certain methods of confinement (“gestation crates”) on pig farms in Massachusetts, the judge’s decision should be upheld despite the plaintiffs’ argument that the statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause and is preempted by federal law.

“In 2016, Massachusetts passed the Act to Prevent Cruelty to Farm Animals (the ‘Massachusetts Act’). As relevant here, the Massachusetts Act prohibits the use of certain methods of confinement (‘gestation crates’) on pig farms in Massachusetts. … It also prohibits the sale, in Massachusetts, of pork products derived from pigs who were confined in gestation crates. … Plaintiffs are out-of-Massachusetts pig farmers and the slaughterhouse those farmers co-own (collectively, ‘Plaintiffs’). They sued to challenge the Massachusetts Act, chiefly arguing that it violated the dormant Commerce Clause and that it was preempted by federal law. The district court disagreed, first dismissing most of the claims and later entering summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the remaining dormant Commerce Clause claim. We affirm the district court’s rulings. …

“Plaintiffs argue that the Massachusetts Act ‘directly and intentionally targets and seeks to regulate out-of-state activity that is permissible in the states in which it occurs’ and represents an attempt to ‘effectively regulate pig farming, manufacturing, and production in other states.’ They posit that the Massachusetts Act therefore offends the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution because that Clause protects the ‘right to practice a trade or profession.’ …

“… Because Plaintiffs are corporations, their argument fails. …

“Plaintiffs articulate two theories under the dormant Commerce Clause: (1) intentional discrimination against interstate commerce and (2) a substantial burden on interstate commerce under the Pike [v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)] test. …

“We hold that the district court did not err in finding insufficient evidence of discriminatory effect and of discriminatory purpose. …

“No ‘substantial’ evidence of discriminatory effect, either of advantage to in-state producers or disadvantage to out-out-state producers, is present here. …

“Plaintiffs alleged that both the [Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA)] and the [Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA)] preempt the Massachusetts Act’s enforcement. At summary judgment, the district court held that the Massachusetts Act was not preempted. … We review the district court’s entry of summary judgment de novo to determine whether Massachusetts is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. …

“As we have previously explained, the district court ruled that one portion of the Massachusetts Act — the ‘slaughterhouse exception’ — violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Accordingly, it severed that provision. Plaintiffs argue that, given that severance, the Massachusetts Act is expressly preempted and preempted by conflict under the FMIA. …

“As for Plaintiffs’ conflict preemption claim, we find that the Massachusetts Act is not preempted by conflict with the FMIA. …

“Accordingly, we hold that the Massachusetts Act is not preempted by the FMIA. …

“… Because the Massachusetts Act does not discriminate, it follows that Plaintiffs’ PSA preemption claim, based wholly on discrimination grounds, fails. The Massachusetts Act ‘does not require packers or wholesalers to favor or disfavor any pork producers based on their location. It instead prohibits packers and wholesalers from selling non-compliant pork meat in [Massachusetts], regardless of where such meat originates.’ Id. The Massachusetts Act does not ‘render it impossible to comply with the [PSA], nor serve as an obstacle to its purposes and objectives.’ …

“Accordingly, we hold that neither the FMIA nor the PSA preempts the Massachusetts Act. …

“Plaintiffs allege that the Massachusetts Act is in ‘direct conflict’ with the ‘Right to Farm’ laws that exist in several states where the Plaintiffs operate, such as in Missouri, Wyoming, and Indiana. … For this reason, Plaintiffs contend that the Massachusetts Act violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. …

“The Massachusetts Act does not ban farming practices in the states Plaintiffs have cited as having Right to Farm laws. Rather, the Massachusetts Act bans the sale of products resulting from certain practices in Massachusetts. … Because these out-of-state farmers are free to continue with their current farming practices, it is our view that the Massachusetts Act does not constitute a ‘policy of hostility’ to their ‘Right to Farm’ laws. …

“We thus find that the Massachusetts Act does not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”

Triumph Foods, LLC, et al. v. Campbell, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-208-25) (47 pages) (Gelpí, J.) Appealed from a decision by Young, J., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Michael T. Raupp, with whom Ryann A. Glenn, Cynthia L. Cordes, Spencer Tolson and Husch Blackwell LLP were on brief, for the plaintiffs-appellants; Maryanne Reynolds, with whom Vanessa A. Arslanian and Grace Gohlke were on brief, for the defendants-appellees (Docket No. 24-1759) (Oct. 3, 2025).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.