Landlord and tenant – Wear and tear

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Where a challenge has been brought to the validity of a residential lease provision requiring a tenant to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease or to bear the costs of later repairs, that provision conflicts with G.L.c. 186 because it allows for security deposit deductions to repair reasonable wear and tear in violation of that statute.

“The Legislature has enacted detailed provisions governing the circumstances under which a lessor of residential property may deduct charges from a tenant’s security deposit at the conclusion of the tenancy. … As most relevant here, if the lessor follows various required procedures, the lessor may deduct a ‘reasonable amount necessary to repair any damage caused to the dwelling unit by the tenant …, reasonable wear and tear excluded.’ G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii). The named plaintiffs in this putative class action pending in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts are former tenants of apartments owned and managed by the defendants. The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have violated G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii), by routinely deducting from tenants’ security deposits charges for ‘reasonable wear and tear.’ The Federal court has certified two questions to this court under S.J.C. Rule 1:03, as appearing in 382 Mass. 700 (1981):

“1. ‘When a tenant vacates a premises at the end of a lease, under what circumstances, if any, does charging him for painting, carpet repair or similar refurbishment constitute a deduction for ‘reasonable wear and tear’ in violation of [G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)]?’

“2. ‘Does inclusion of a provision in a lease requiring a tenant to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease or to bear the costs of later repairs constitute a violation of [G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)]?’ …

“To the first question, we respond that a tenant’s reasonable use of a property as a residence under the terms of a lease is expected to result in gradual deterioration of the property over time, and such wear and tear ultimately may require painting, carpet repair, or similar refurbishment at the end of a lease. The security deposit statute does not permit deductions from a tenant’s security deposit to repair such reasonable wear and tear. G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii). Whether the damage to a particular property is ‘reasonable wear and tear’ within the meaning of G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii), is a fact-specific question depending on all the circumstances, including but not limited to the nature and cause of the damage, the deterioration to be expected as a result of reasonable use during the tenant’s or tenants’ occupancy under the lease, the condition of the property at the start of the lease, and the length of the occupancy.

“To the second question, we respond that a lease provision requiring a tenant to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease, on penalty of bearing the costs of repairs regardless of whether the damage is reasonable wear and tear, conflicts with G.L.c. 186, §15B(4), because the provision allows for deductions from the security deposit to repair reasonable wear and tear in violation of G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii). Such a lease provision is void and unenforceable under G.L.c. 186, §15B(8). …

“The question whether damage is reasonable wear and tear thus is a fact-specific one depending on all the circumstances. These include but are not limited to the nature and cause of the damage, the condition of the property at the start of the lease, the use for which a property was leased, the deterioration of the property to be expected as a result of its reasonable use for that purpose, and the length of the occupancy. …

“Because the question whether damage is reasonable wear and tear thus depends on all the relevant circumstances, we cannot respond to the Federal court’s first certified question by setting the bright-line rule requested by the plaintiffs, that all security deposit deductions for damage requiring cleaning or painting are deductions for reasonable wear and tear in violation of G.L.c. 186, §15B(4). Rather, we respond that a tenant’s reasonable use of a property as a residence is expected to result in gradual deterioration that ultimately may require painting, carpet cleaning or repair, or other refurbishment at the end of the lease, and security deposit deductions for such reasonable wear and tear violate the statute. Whether damage to a particular property is in fact ‘reasonable wear and tear’ within the meaning of G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii), depends on all the circumstances, including but not limited to the nature and cause of the damage, the deterioration to be expected as a result of the tenant’s or tenants’ reasonable use of the property under the terms of the lease, the condition of the property at the start of the lease, and the length of the occupancy. …

“We next turn to the second certified question: whether ‘inclusion of a provision in a lease requiring a tenant to have the premises professionally cleaned at the end of the lease or to bear the costs of later repairs constitute[s] a violation of [G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)].’ …

“This lease provision conflicts with G.L.c. 186, §15B(4). The provision states that, if an apartment is not returned in ‘professionally cleaned’ condition, deductions for painting, carpet cleaning, and cleaning or replacement of various other items ‘will be applied,’ without any apparent allowance for reasonable wear and tear on the apartment over the course of the tenant’s occupancy. Underscoring the lack of allowance for reasonable wear and tear, the addendum further specifies that the listed cleaning and replacement charges ‘will be assessed regardless of how long [a] resident occupies the apartment.’ Yet G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii), permits a deduction for repairs only if, among other prerequisites, the damage to be repaired is not ‘reasonable wear and tear,’ and the statute forbids deductions from the security deposit ‘for any purpose other than those set forth in this section,’ G. L. c. 186, § 15B (4). The lease provision thus conflicts with the statute, because it provides for security deposit deductions for repairs such as painting or carpet replacement that may, depending on the circumstances, be repairs of reasonable wear and tear. …

“As the plaintiffs argue, because this lease provision conflicts with the security deposit statute, it is unenforceable. …

“Our answer to the first certified question is that a tenant’s reasonable use of a property as a residence is expected to result in gradual deterioration that ultimately may require ‘painting, carpet repair or similar refurbishment’ at the end of the lease, and security deposit deductions for repairs of such reasonable wear and tear violate G.L.c. 186, §15B(4). Whether damage to a particular property is ‘reasonable wear and tear’ within the meaning of G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii), is a fact-specific question depending on all the circumstances, including but not limited to the nature and cause of the damage, the deterioration to be expected as a result of reasonable use during the tenant’s or tenants’ occupancy under the terms of the lease, the condition of the property at the start of the lease, and the length of the occupancy.

“Our answer to the second question is that a lease provision requiring the tenant to leave the premises in ‘professionally cleaned’ condition at the end of the lease, on penalty of security deposit deductions for the cost of painting, cleaning, or other repairs regardless of whether the damage is reasonable wear and tear, conflicts with G.L.c. 186, §15B(4), because the statute does not permit deductions from a security deposit for repairs of ‘reasonable wear and tear,’ G.L.c. 186, §15B(4)(iii). Thus in conflict with the statute, such a lease provision is void and unenforceable under G.L.c. 186, §15B(8).”

Peebles, et al. v. JRK Property Holdings, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-096-25) (22 pages) (Dewar, J.) Keith L. Sachs for the plaintiffs; Thomas H. Wintner (Mathilda S. McGee-Tubb also present) for the defendants; the following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Jeffrey C. Turk and Rachelle D. Willard for Greater Boston Real Estate Board; Alycia M. Kennedy, David A. Brown, Richard M.W. Bauer, Daniel Ordorica, Lisa Marshall, Jessica Bridgette Drew and Daniel Jacobson for Community Action Agency of Somerville and another; Andrea Joy Campbell and Jane Alexandra Sugarman for the Attorney General (Docket No. SJC-13702) (Aug. 1, 2025).

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