Employment – Involuntary reassignment – Pretext

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Where a defendant employer was awarded summary judgment on a plaintiff’s claims of discrimination and retaliation, that judgment should be affirmed because of the plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate that the employer’s reasons for reassigning her were pretextual.

“Carmen Quintana-Dieppa (‘Quintana’) sued her employer, the Department of the Army (‘the Army’), alleging sex and race discrimination as well as retaliation, under 42 U.S.C. §2000 et. seq., and age discrimination under 29 U.S.C. §621 et. seq. Upon conclusion of discovery, the Army moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of Quintana’s claims. The district court agreed and granted the Army’s motion. Quintana appealed. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s judgment. …

“… Quintana asserts that three of her claims should have survived summary judgment on appeal: (1) sex and race discrimination under Title VII, (2) age discrimination under ADEA, and (3) retaliation under Title VII. In support of these claims, she makes a slew of disjointed arguments in an attempt to show that the involuntary reassignment was discriminatory or retaliatory. Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination and retaliation, we employ the three-stage burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). …

“For the purposes of appeal, we assume, without deciding, that Quintana established a prima facie case for all her claims and skip directly to the second and third stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. We focus on whether Quintana met her burden of showing that the Army’s stated reason for the reassignment is pretext for discrimination or retaliation such that a trial is warranted. …

“… The Army stresses that it reassigned Quintana because it had ‘serious and substantiated concerns’ about her ‘management style and treatment of employees under her supervision.’ These concerns were supported by the findings from the Army’s two investigations, which were based on statements by many of her subordinates. These reasons are sufficient to meet the Army’s burden at step two. …

“Quintana circumstantial argues evidence, that that she the can prove, Army’s through ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her involuntary reassignment was pretextual.’ In her attempt to do so, she attacks the validity of the Army’s investigation reports, asserting that ‘they are based on inadmissible hearsay statements’ and ‘fabricated.’ Neither of these attacks has persuasive force. …

“Quintana further asserts the second investigation report never recommended reassignment, and that the Army rejected all other lenient options in taking disciplinary action against her. We are not persuaded. …

“We turn now to Quintana’s Title VII retaliation claim. Quintana’s position is that her Army supervisors retaliated against her by reassigning her after learning that she had filed an EEOC complaint. The Army’s position remains that it reassigned Quintana based on the findings of the two investigations, which showed that Quintana was a poor manager. …

“Quintana raises a new line of argument in support of her retaliation claim that we have yet to address. She attempts to link her protected conduct and the purportedly retaliatory act by pointing to temporal proximity — i.e., according to Quintana, her November 2017 involuntarily reassignment came shortly after her supervisors learned about the EEOC action at a meeting in July or August of 2017 with one of the individuals Quintana named in her EEOC complaint. …

“Accepting Quintana’s version of events at face value, we doubt that the three- or four-month period between the two events would suffice to establish the causal link required for even a prima facie showing of retaliation. … However, we need not rest our opinion on this basis. Simply put, although very close ‘temporal proximity may suffice for a prima facie case of retaliation,’ it ‘does not satisfy [Quintana’s] ultimate burden to establish that the true explanation’ for her reassignment ‘was retaliation for engaging in protected conduct rather than poor performance.’ … Here, apart from at best modest temporal proximity, Quintana has provided no other evidence that the Army’s reasons for reassigning her were pretextual. Thus, she failed to meet her ultimate burden to show retaliatory motive under the McDonnell Douglas test.”

Quintana-Dieppa v. Department of the Army (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-037-25) (33 pages) (Gelpí, J.) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico (Docket No. 22-1858) (Feb. 25, 2025).

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