Forfeiture – Return of property – Vacated convictions

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Where plaintiffs whose criminal convictions were vacated because of misconduct by two state chemists in Massachusetts have requested an order requiring the automatic return of their forfeited property, the 11th Amendment bars all the relief sought by the plaintiffs.

“For almost a decade, two state chemists in Massachusetts tampered with drug evidence and falsified test results, undermining the reliability of forensic evidence in tens of thousands of drug cases. After their egregious misconduct was discovered, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) vacated and dismissed with prejudice over 30,000 criminal cases tainted by their actions. Eventually, the SJC also determined that, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, affected individuals were entitled to the repayment of most funds collected as a consequence of their now-vacated convictions, but not to the automatic return of any forfeited property seized in connection with those convictions. See Commonwealth v. Martinez, 109 N.E.3d 459, 471-76 (Mass. 2018). Instead, because of the different legal standards and procedures necessary for a conviction as opposed to a forfeiture order, the SJC held that individuals seeking return of their property would need to file motions for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. …

“Plaintiffs in this case, dissatisfied with the SJC’s ruling on the forfeiture issue, request a federal court order that would essentially require the automatic return of their forfeited property. They also seek related relief, such as an accounting of all forfeited property and additional procedural protections in Rule 60(b) proceedings. The Commonwealth defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on several grounds, including that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits suits in federal court against a state by its own citizens. The district court dismissed the complaint in part. It held that it could not order the automatic return of plaintiffs’ forfeited property, but that plaintiffs’ other claims could proceed under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment, [209 U.S. 123 (1908),] which permits suits against state officials in federal court in certain circumstances. The Commonwealth defendants appealed.

“We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars all the relief sought by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ attempt to recover their forfeited property focuses on a past alleged wrong, but the Ex parte Young exception applies only when individuals seek prospective relief against a state official’s ongoing violation of federal law. Because there is no ongoing violation to anchor plaintiffs’ various claims, there is no prospective or ancillary relief to grant. Plaintiffs’ claim for additional procedural protections in state court also cannot proceed under Ex parte Young because the state officials they sued lack the authority to enforce or change those procedures. We therefore reverse the district court’s partial denial of the motion to dismiss and remand with instructions to dismiss the case in full. …

“Although plaintiffs attempt to characterize the Commonwealth defendants’ continued withholding of forfeited property as an ongoing violation, the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs had alleged only a past wrong rather than an ongoing one. And without an ongoing violation and future misconduct to enjoin, there is no prospective relief or ancillary relief for a federal court to grant. Finally, plaintiffs’ request for additional procedural protections in state court fails under Ex parte Young because plaintiffs sued state officials who lack the authority to enforce or change these procedures. Thus, we conclude that the Eleventh Amendment bars all the plaintiffs’ claims.”

Cotto, et al. v. Campbell, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-017-25) (23 pages) (Rikelman, J.) Appealed from a decision by Talwani, J., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Christine Fimognari, with whom Andrea Joy Campbell, Anne Sterman and Katherine B. Dirks were on brief, for the defendants-appellants; Daniel N. Marx, with whom William W. Fick, Luke Ryan, Fick & Marx and Strehorn, Ryan & Hoose were on brief, for the plaintiffs-appellees (Docket No. 23-2069) (Jan. 21, 2025).

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