Employment – Vaccination – Religious discrimination

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Where a plaintiff’s employment was terminated after her request for an exemption from the defendant employer’s vaccination requirement was denied, a judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s religious discrimination claims must be vacated because the plaintiff adequately pleaded a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with the vaccination requirement.

“Plaintiff-Appellant Regina M. Thornton (‘Thornton’) was employed by Defendant-Appellee Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. (‘Ipsen’) as Associate Director – Patient Safety. In September 2021, Ipsen implemented a policy requiring its employees to receive COVID-19 vaccinations. Citing her religious beliefs, Thornton submitted a request for an exemption from the vaccination requirement, which Ipsen denied. After Thornton did not comply with the vaccination requirement, Ipsen terminated her employment.

“Thornton sued Ipsen in the Superior Court of Massachusetts, County of Middlesex, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (‘Title VII’), and the corresponding Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B (‘Chapter 151B’); the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (‘MDR’). Ipsen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts and moved to dismiss all counts. The United States Magistrate Judge who presided over the case with the parties’ consent granted Ipsen’s motion, dismissing Thornton’s complaint. Thornton appealed.

“For the reasons explained below, we reverse in part and affirm in part. …

“The SAC and the exhibits attached thereto set forth various beliefs that, Thornton contends, are religious in nature and conflict with Ipsen’s vaccination requirement. …

“… She alleges that she holds certain religious beliefs that conflicted with the vaccination requirement — namely, that the tenets of her religion prohibited her from defiling her perfectly created body, and that her prayers and guidance from the Holy Spirit informed her beliefs that receiving the COVID-19 vaccine would violate that tenet of her faith. She further alleges that prayer is one of the ways in which she ‘follow[s] God’s word’ — including the commandment to not defile one’s body. Thus, she has plausibly alleged that her belief that the vaccine would defile her body is not an ‘isolated moral teaching,’ but rather is part of a ‘comprehensive system of beliefs about fundamental or ultimate matters’ that the plaintiff articulated. …

“… Thornton’s factual allegations, accepted as true, indicate that her beliefs are ‘firmly established in [her] faith, the Holy Bible, and [her] conviction that what God has created is perfect’; she is ‘created in [God’s] image and defying’ that is wrong; her faith requires her to maintain a pure body and soul; she prays for guidance; and after praying, she interpreted ‘the guidance of the Holy Spirit’ to be saying that her receiving the COVID-19 vaccine ‘would violate [her] sincerely held religious beliefs and jeopardize [her] soul … by defiling [her] perfectly created body that He created in His image by receiving the vaccine.’ At this nascent stage of the litigation, Thornton need allege no more facts — nor more specific ones — to show that she holds sincere religious beliefs that conflicted with the vaccination requirement. … Therefore, we reverse the Magistrate Judge’s holding to the contrary.”

Other counts

“We next turn to Thornton’s federal constitutional claims. Thornton alleges that Ipsen violated her rights to equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Ipsen, of course, is a private actor, against whom the Fourteenth Amendment ‘erects no shield.’ … Still, Thornton contends that Ipsen is a proper defendant for these Fourteenth Amendment claims because it was coerced to act by the federal government. … The Fourteenth Amendment, however, does not apply to the federal government. U.S. Const. amend XIV. Thus, these claims fail for that reason alone. …

“Finally, we review Thornton’s MDR claim. …

“On appeal, Thornton develops no argument to contest the Magistrate Judge’s holding that the MDR does not provide a private cause of action, and thus, she has waived any such challenge to it. … Instead, Thornton does insist that her MDR claim should be reimagined as a claim brought pursuant to the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (‘MCRA’), which provides a ‘mechanism for obtaining relief from the interference, or attempted interference, with rights conferred by Federal or Massachusetts law.’ Howcroft v. City of Peabody, 747 N.E.2d 729, 745 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001). She cannot do so. …

“Therefore, we affirm the Magistrate Judge’s dismissal of Thornton’s MDR claim and decline to address the merits of Thornton’s new MCRA claim. …

“For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Magistrate Judge as to the religious discrimination claims under Title VII and Chapter 151B, and we affirm the judgment as to the other claims.”

Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-012-25) (20 pages) (Gelpí, J.) Appealed from a decision by Boal, U.S.M.J., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Richard C. Chambers Jr., with whom Joseph Spinale was on brief, for the plaintiff-appellant. Jonathan Rosenfeld and Michael Lenzi, with whom Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP was on brief, for the defendant-appellee (Docket No. 23-1951) (Jan. 16, 2025).

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