Constitutional – Commitment – Buildings and grounds restriction

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Where a District Court order restricted a respondent to the buildings and grounds of the facility to which he was committed, that order deprived the respondent of his constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process, so it must be vacated.

“F.A. has been committed involuntarily to State mental health facilities since 1999. In 2020, after renewing F.A.’s involuntary commitment, a District Court judge ordered F.A. restricted to the buildings and grounds of the facility to which he was committed, pursuant to G.L.c. 123, §16(e) (§16[e]). F.A. now challenges the constitutionality of the buildings and grounds restriction. For the reasons discussed infra, we reverse and vacate the order. …

“Here, the Commonwealth contends that the decision satisfied strict scrutiny because a judge may impose a §16(e) restriction only after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a person’s commitment is necessary pursuant to §16(c). We disagree. Section 16(c) and (e) provide judges with two different means of curtailing freedom of movement and require two distinct analyses to justify the exercise of those powers pursuant to each provision. Thus, a finding that an involuntary commitment is necessary pursuant to §16(c) does not vitiate the need to conduct a further analysis of whether an additional order further restricting a person to the buildings and grounds of the facility pursuant to §16(e) also survives strict scrutiny. …

“Here, although the judge considered F.A.’s ‘mental illness, clinical presentation, and likelihood of serious harm’ in rendering her decision, the judge did not find that imposing a buildings and grounds restriction was the least restrictive means to safeguard public safety (or any other compelling government interest). … In fact, in commenting that §16(e) presented an ‘all or nothing proposition,’ the judge appeared to believe that the provision required that she either order the mandatory, year-long restriction or take the risk that, without such restriction, the facility might allow F.A. to leave the grounds while unsupervised. The judge instead should have considered the viability and adequacy of alternative less restrictive measures, including forgoing the imposition of a court-ordered restriction and entrusting the WRCH with managing F.A.’s care, movements, and any off-grounds privileges he may (or may not) enjoy pursuant to its extensive internal protocols.

“In sum, to comply with a respondent’s substantive due process rights, a judge imposing a §16(e) restriction must find that a buildings and grounds restriction is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and that no less restrictive alternatives are available to achieve that end. … Because there was no explicit finding of the restriction’s necessity or consideration of less restrictive alternatives, the order violated F.A.’s constitutional rights to substantive due process. …

“Separately, we conclude that the motion judge violated F.A.’s constitutional rights to procedural due process by imposing a buildings and grounds restriction on F.A. without issuing concomitant findings on the record that doing so was warranted by clear and convincing evidence. …

“… As we repeatedly have affirmed, to restrict one’s liberty pursuant to G.L.c. 123, the Commonwealth must provide, at the very least, ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that such restriction is necessary to meet a compelling governmental interest. …

“Here, rather than using the clear and convincing standard, the judge required a lesser quantum of proof — ‘substantial evidence’ — to support the §16(e) restriction. Additionally, the judge failed to produce particularized findings to accompany her order until eleven months after the hearing. … Accordingly, the decision violated F.A.’s procedural due process rights. …

“Although the plain text of §16(e) does not so indicate, a person who is committed involuntarily may not have his or her movements further restricted pursuant to that provision unless substantive and procedural due process requirements have been met. That is, a judge must find that the restriction is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest and that no less restrictive alternatives are available; these findings and the bases therefore must be expressly set forth by the judge.

“Because the order at issue here deprived F.A. of his constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process, it is hereby vacated.”

In the Matter of F.A. (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-104-24) (12 pages) (Budd, C.J.) A motion for a buildings and grounds restriction was heard by Janet J. McGuiggan, J., in District Court. Ilana Hollenberg for F.A.; Patricia J. Reilly for the commonwealth; Alex Bou-Rhodes, Tatum A. Pritchard, Steven J. Schwartz and Jennifer Honig submitted a brief for Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee and others, amici curiae (Docket No. SJC-13515) (Sept. 18, 2024).

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