Criminal – ‘Switchblade’ – Second Amendment

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Where a defendant was convicted of possessing a spring-release pocketknife known as a “switchblade” under G.L.c. 269, §10(b), that charge should have been dismissed because §10(b)’s prohibition against carrying a switchblade knife violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Reversed.

“Since 1957, G.L.c. 269, §10(b) (§10[b]), has prohibited people from possessing certain spring-release pocketknives, commonly known as ‘switchblades.’ In this case, we are asked to decide whether §10(b)’s prohibition against carrying a switchblade knife violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, considering the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) (Bruen). We conclude it does. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. …

“Bruen requires that we employ a two-part test to determine whether a regulation or restriction passes constitutional muster under the Second Amendment. First, we must determine whether ‘the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.’ Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17. If the regulated conduct falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment, our analysis ends. If, on the other hand, we conclude the regulated conduct is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment, ‘the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct,’ and we proceed to the second part of the analysis. … In the second part of the analysis, ‘the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of [arms] regulation.’ …

“Accordingly, applying the Bruen two-part analytical framework to this case, we first examine whether a switchblade is an ‘arm’ under the plain text of the Second Amendment. If so, we then analyze whether the Commonwealth has demonstrated §10(b)’s prohibition against carrying a switchblade is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition of arms regulation. …

“In short, folding pocketknives not only fit within contemporaneous dictionary definitions of arms — which would encompass a broader category of knives that today includes switchblades — but they also were commonly possessed by law abiding citizens for lawful purposes around the time of the founding. Setting aside any question whether switchblades are in common use today for lawful purposes, we conclude switchblades are ‘arms’ for Second Amendment purposes. Therefore, the carrying of switchblades is presumptively protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. We now turn to whether G.L.c. 269, §10(b), is consistent with this nation’s historical tradition of arms regulation. …

“Again, even where a class of weapons constitutes bearable arms presumptively protected by the Second Amendment, the government may still justify its regulation by demonstrating the regulation is consistent with our nation’s historical tradition. … At this second step of the analysis, Bruen requires us to determine whether ‘a challenged regulation addresses a general societal problem that has persisted since the [Eighteenth Century].’ … If so, ‘the lack of distinctly similar historical regulation addressing that problem is relevant evidence that the challenged regulation is inconsistent with the Second Amendment.’ …

“The Commonwealth may meet its burden by pointing to analogous regulations enacted close in time to the ratification of either the Second Amendment in 1791 or the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. … Here, the Commonwealth attempts to meet its burden by pointing to three Nineteenth Century cases upholding statutory restrictions on certain types of knives, arguing these cases demonstrate a historical tradition of regulating certain knives. We are not convinced. …

“Accordingly, the Commonwealth has not met its burden of demonstrating a historical tradition justifying the regulation of switchblade knives under §10(b). …

“We reverse the order denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The defendant’s admission to sufficient facts on the §10(b) charge is vacated, and judgment shall enter for the defendant on that offense.”

Commonwealth v. Canjura (Lawyers Weekly No. 10-093-24) (18 pages) (Georges, J.) A motion to dismiss was heard by James M. Stanton, J., and a conditional plea was accepted by him. Kaitlyn Gerber for the defendant; Elisabeth Martino for the commonwealth; the following submitted briefs for amici curiae: Andrea Joy Campbell and Thomas E. Bocian for the Attorney General; Daniel L. Schmutter, of New Jersey, and Jason A. Guida for Knife Rights, Inc., and another; Luke Ryan and Claudia Leis Bolgen for River Valley Taekwondo and another (Docket No. SJC-13432) (Aug. 27, 2024).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.