Employment – Gender discrimination – Causation

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Where summary judgment was awarded to the defendants on a plaintiff’s claims of gender discrimination, the judgment must be vacated because the judge used an incorrect standard in determining that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination.

“The plaintiff, Mary Regan, appeals from a Superior Court judgment entered following the grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer and two supervisors on her claims of gender discrimination, retaliation, interference, and aiding and abetting under G.L.c. 151B. We vacate the judgment on the claim of gender discrimination and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the judgment on the claims of retaliation, interference, and aiding and abetting. …

“… In August 2011, President and Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard) hired Regan as Associate Portfolio Director for the Executive Education program at Harvard Business School (HBS). …

“Regan contends that the judge used an incorrect standard in determining that she had failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination against Harvard for the purposes of summary judgment. We agree. …

“Here, the judge began her analysis by acknowledging the proper standard, stating that the case ‘must be approached using the three-part burden-shifting analysis.’ However, the judge then analyzed Regan’s discrimination claim based on the evidentiary burden required at trial, including the element of causation. … In a discrimination case arising from a termination, the plaintiff’s prima facie case at summary judgment has only three elements: (1) membership in a class protected by G.L.c. 151B, (2) job performance at an acceptable level, and (3) termination. See id. at 680-681. Causation is not one of these elements. Rather, causation is relevant at the third stage of the burden-shifting paradigm. Additionally, although applicable to a plaintiff’s burden of proof of causation at trial, … evidence that Regan was treated differently than a male comparator was not required as part of her prima facie case. Thus, it was also error for the judge to consider comparator evidence.”

Regan v. Hooper, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 81-093-24) (10 pages) (Docket No. 23-P-56) (Aug. 16, 2024).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.