Employment – Chapter 151B – Employer status

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Where a defendant has moved for summary judgment on a plaintiff’s two G.L.c. 151B claims, that motion should be allowed because the defendant — a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Texas — was not the plaintiff’s employer.

“Plaintiff, Jorge Baez, was employed as a counselor at a medication-assisted addiction treatment facility in Chicopee, Massachusetts from 1997 until November 2020. His employer terminated his employment following an investigation into time discrepancies between the billing records he submitted for telehealth counseling sessions and his telephone records. In his Complaint, filed in Massachusetts Superior Court, Plaintiff alleged Defendant, BayMark Detoxification Services, Inc. (‘Defendant’), a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Texas, terminated his employment in violation of Massachusetts law barring disability discrimination and retaliation by employers. … Defendant has now moved for summary judgment and argued, in part, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the undisputed facts establish that it was not Plaintiff’s employer. …

“Defendant has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s two claims, brought pursuant to the Massachusetts statute that protects employees from disability-based discrimination and retaliation by employers. … Chapter 151B prohibits discriminatory employment practices by an ‘employer.’ DeLia v. Verizon Comms. Inc., 656 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2011). Defendant contends that it cannot be liable under Chapter 151B because it was not Plaintiff’s employer. Although the statute itself offers little guidance, courts have held an ‘employer’ is the entity that exercised control over the employee’s workplace. … Applied to this case, the definition compels the conclusion that Defendant was not Plaintiff’s employer. Though there are factual disputes about whether Plaintiff’s employer was [Community Health Care, Inc. (CHC)] or [BayMark Health Services, Inc. (BHS)], it is uncontested that Defendant had no employees and played no role in operating the Chicopee facility. …

“… While it is unfortunate that he is not able to pursue his substantive claims because he has sued Defendant, rather than his former employer, Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause to amend his complaint at this late date.

“Finally, Plaintiff has not cited any authority that would allow this court to impose Chapter 151B liability on Defendant simply because it is a subsidiary of BHS. … There are twelve factors a court must consider before disregarding corporate form. … Plaintiff has addressed only two of these factors, noting that the same individuals own and control Defendant and BHS. … These limited observations fall far short of establishing a basis for this court to disregard Defendant’s corporate form. In the absence of evidence of the types of egregious conduct that justifies disregard for corporate separation, both Defendant and BHS would clearly be prejudiced by any course of action that treats them as interchangeable entities.”

Baez v. BayMark Detoxification Services, Inc. (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-039-24) (9 pages) (Mastroianni, J.) (Civil Action No. 22-30001-MGM) (Jan. 18, 2024).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.