Employment – MCRA – Fire department

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Where a plaintiff has brought suit over his employment as a firefighter with the city of Springfield, his claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act against the defendant fire commissioner should not be dismissed, as they are more properly considered on a more complete factual record at the summary judgment stage.

“Currently before the court is a partial motion to dismiss filed by the defendants City of Springfield (‘City’) and Bernard Calvi in his personal capacity and his official capacity as Fire Commissioner of the City (‘Calvi’) (collectively, ‘Defendants’), seeking dismissal of certain claims stated in the Second Amended Complaint (‘SAC’) of the plaintiff, Pierre Grenier (‘Plaintiff’), in connection with his employment as a firefighter with the City. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants discriminated against him based on his age and his status as a veteran and a disabled individual, and that Calvi interfered with Plaintiff’s exercise of his civil rights and his contractual relationship with the City. …

“The court turns first to those portions of Defendants’ motion that Plaintiff agrees should be allowed. First, Count V asserted claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §11I (‘MCRA’). Plaintiff agrees that so much of Count V as asserted a MCRA claim against the City should be dismissed (Dkt. No. 24 at 1). Second, Count XII states a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress and Count XIII states a loss of consortium claim on behalf of Michelle Grenier. Plaintiff agrees to dismiss these claims against Defendants (Dkt. No. 24 at 1). Third, Count IV alleges violations of the Civil Service Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 31, against both Defendants. Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the claims in Count IV against Defendants (Dkt. No. 24 at 2). Fourth, Counts X and XI allege interference with contractual relations against Defendants. Plaintiff agrees to dismiss so much of Counts X and XI as sought to state claims against the City (Dkt. No. 24 at 2). Fifth, Counts I, II and III purport to assert claims against Calvi in his personal and official capacity. Plaintiff agrees to dismiss the claims asserted against Calvi in his personal capacity (Dkt. No. 24 at 2). …

“… Plaintiff’s claims against Calvi in his official capacity in Counts I, II, and III are duplicative of his claims against the City asserted in those counts and are subject to dismissal with prejudice for this reason. …

“In addition, there is no individual liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (‘ADA’) (Count I), …; the Rehabilitation Act (Count II), …; or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (Count III). …

“For these reasons, the claims against Calvi in his official capacity in Counts I, II and III will be dismissed with prejudice. …

“Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s MCRA claims against Calvi should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not clearly identified a federal or state constitutional or legal right of which he has been deprived; his MCRA claims are duplicative of his discrimination claims and subject to dismissal on this basis; and, accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations, he has not identified any act by Calvi that rises to the level of threats, intimidation or coercion (Dkt. No. 21 at 2-10). For his part, Plaintiff identifies his right to invoke remedies under the Department’s policies and procedures protected under a collective bargaining agreement (‘CBA’) to address Calvi’s animosity to him, and his right to be ‘fairly and justly considered for promotion’ (Dkt. No. 25 at 13-14). He identifies his interactions with Calvi at the fire station on May 26, 2019, and at the fire scene on November 19, 2019, as times when Calvi engaged in threatening or coercive conduct.

“In the court’s view, while some or all of these contentions may very well have merit, they are more properly considered on a more complete factual record at the summary judgment stage, particularly where discovery will be substantially similar whether or not these claims remain in the case. … While Plaintiff’s allegations are thin, he appears to claim that he had a right, legally protected under Massachusetts law, to a hearing that could have protected him against adverse action by a Department Fire Commissioner who was prejudiced against him. While the claim is tenuous as stated in the SAC, it is arguably not without some support in the caselaw. For example, in Blasko v. Doerpholz, Civil Action No. 15-30185-MGM, 2017 WL 1196647, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2017), the court identified contractual rights to a safe working environment and continued employment as examples of rights that might be protected under the MCRA. … Chapter 151B’s antidiscrimination provisions would not protect any rights Plaintiff had as a Department employee who had contractual and due process protections by virtue of that status. To the extent the SAC states claims under the MCRA, those claims are not recast discrimination claims remediable exclusively — or at all — under Chapter 151B. …

“As to threats, intimidation, or coercion, while the allegations are again tenuous, Plaintiff alleges that Calvi, as Fire Commissioner, had complete authority over Department employees and was the final arbiter of decisions about promotion, discipline, and termination of employment. Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable employee in his position might interpret Calvi’s stop at the fire station after hearing that Plaintiff had set the wheels in motion for a formal hearing, was intended to intimidate or coerce Plaintiff into abandoning his right to a hearing to protect his position and promotional aspirations in the Department. This aspect of the claim also merits evaluation on a more complete factual record. …

“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is granted as to Plaintiff’s claims against both Defendants in Counts IV, XII, and XIII, as to the City in Counts V, X, and XI, and as to Calvi in his personal and official capacities in Counts I, II and III. Defendants’ Motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s claims against Calvi in Count V, VI, VII, and VIII. Michelle Grenier is dismissed as a plaintiff in the case.”

Grenier v. City of Springfield, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-017-24) (11 pages) (Robertson, U.S.M.J.) (Docket No. 23-cv-30011-KAR) (Jan. 10, 2024).

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