Employment – MCRA – At-will status

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Where a plaintiff has asserted a count under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act alleging that the defendant employer interfered with his exercise of his First Amendment rights by threatening to terminate him for expressing his political views, the employer’s motion to dismiss that count should be denied because it is not clear from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff was an at-will employee.

“Plaintiff George Rodrique II brought this lawsuit against defendants Hearst Communications, Inc., and Hearst Stations, Inc. (collectively, Hearst) for the alleged wrongful termination of his employment. …

“Count IV arises under the MCRA, which provides a cause of action for any person whose ‘exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by’ the Constitution, federal law, or state law have been interfered with ‘by threats, intimidation, or coercion.’ … Rodrique asserts that Hearst Stations interfered with his exercise of his First Amendment rights by threatening to terminate him for expressing his political views. Hearst moves to dismiss this claim, arguing that the First Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently plead (1) threats, intimidation, or coercion or (2) interference with any recognized protected interest. …

“As to the first argument, Hearst maintains that, because the only threat, intimidation, or coercion alleged in the First Amended Complaint is the threat of termination, and because the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has established as a matter of law that termination of an at-will employee is not coercive in the relevant sense, Rodrique fails to state a claim. The problem is this: It is not clear from the face of the complaint that Rodrique was an at-will employee. The First Amended Complaint alleges only that Rodrique’s employment was governed by a series of CBAs and that those agreements limited the circumstances under which he could be discharged. It is silent as to whether the CBAs similarly limited Hearst’s right to terminate its employees. And while the court could reasonably infer from that silence that there are no limitations on Hearst’s right in this regard, the court may also reasonably infer the opposite, namely, that Hearst did not have free reign to fire employees protected by the terms of a CBA. A dismissal for failure to properly allege ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ would at this point be premature.

“As to the second argument, Hearst contends that, because case law establishes that an employer does not interfere with the right to free speech when it terminates an at-will employee based on his speech, Rodrique has failed to allege any cognizable interference with a protected interest. But, as noted above, the First Amended Complaint does not establish that Rodrique was an at-will employee. It would thus be inappropriate to dismiss the claim at this stage. The court accordingly denies defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count IV against Hearst Stations.”

Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc., et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-258-23) (8 pages) (Stearns, J.) (Civil Action No. 22-12152-RGS) (June 12, 2023).

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