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Education – Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

1st Circuit

Natalie Miller//November 2, 2018//

Education – Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

1st Circuit

Natalie Miller//November 2, 2018//

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Where a state provides significant funding and oversight over adult education programs designed to educate students to the level of academic competence associated with the completion of secondary school and offers this to students between the ages of 21 and 22, the Individuals with Disabilities Act requires that state to provide special education services to students with disabilities through the age of 22.

“… K.L., through her parent L.L., and on behalf of a certified class of those similarly situated, asserts that Rhode Island violates the [Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (‘IDEA’)] because it provides ‘public education’ to individuals without disabilities between the ages of 21 and 22, but does not provide special education services to qualifying individuals with disabilities of the same age.

“The IDEA requires states to provide ‘[a] free appropriate public education [‘FAPE’] . . . to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive[.]’ 20 U.S.C. section1412(a)(1)(A). Pursuant to this mandate, all students ‘who are [otherwise] eligible for special education services are entitled to continue receiving those services until they turn twenty-two.’ L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 669 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2012); see also St. Johnsbury Acad. v. D.H., 240 F.3d 163, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2001).

“… [However,] a state need not provide FAPE to qualified students aged 18 through 21 if doing so ‘would be inconsistent with State law or practice . . . respecting the provision of public education.’ 20 U.S.C. section1412(a)(1)(B)(i). …

“… [A] state’s provision of ‘public education’ for students from age 18 through age 21 triggers the IDEA’s section1412(a)(1)(A) FAPE mandate for students with disabilities in the same age range. …

“… [T]he IDEA does not define the term ‘public education.’ … Based on our understanding of the phrase’s ordinary meaning, … the attributes of ‘public education’ are: (1) significant funding from a public source[,] … (2) public administration or oversight[, and] … (3) the education of students to the academic competence ordinarily associated with completion of secondary school. …

“… The fact that some forms of adult education constitute ‘transition services’ under the IDEA does not remotely suggest that adult education in other forms is not ‘public education’ within the meaning of the IDEA. …

“… [T]he question before us is whether the adult education offered in Rhode Island possesses sufficient attributes of ‘public education’ to so qualify under the IDEA. …

“… Rhode Island funds a network of community-based organizations (‘CBOs’) to deliver adult education to students who have aged-out of … the state’s public schools. Such services cover persons between the ages of 21 and 22, in addition to persons of other ages.

“Rhode Island provides approximately eighty percent of the total costs of the CBO adult-education programs …

“RIDE — the same state agency that oversees Rhode Island’s public school system generally — also oversees the CBO adult education providers. … RIDE monitors adult education providers through the use of accountability measures, including setting performance targets. … RIDE can sanction CBOs by withdrawing public funding if their adult education performance is deemed inadequate. …

“Lastly, a primary objective of the Rhode Island adult education program is to assist students in achieving a secondary- education level of academic competence. …

“… [T]he adult education services in Rhode Island [therefore] qualify as ‘public education’ within the meaning of the IDEA. … ”

Dissenting judge’s comments

Lynch, J. “… The majority’s definition of ‘public education’ as used in 20 U.S.C. section1412(a)(1)(B)(i) is refuted by the text, is inconsistent with the term’s ordinary meaning and the statutory context, and is, I believe, contrary to congressional intent.

“The IDEA was meant to ensure equal opportunities for disabled and non-disabled students in the provision of ‘public education.’ … ‘Public education’ encompasses preschool, elementary school, and secondary school that is free, paid for by the state, and controlled by the state. This does not include ‘adult education,’ which the IDEA classifies as a ‘post-school activit[y],’ and which the statute distinguishes from regular ‘school.’ …

“Given this statutory scheme, the majority’s definition of ‘public education’ is unsupportable. …

“The specific features of Rhode Island’s adult education system also clearly distinguish it from ‘public education.’ First, adult education in Rhode Island is not free and is not provided wholly at public expense. …

“Second, the adult education programs are not controlled by the state. The programs are offered through a network of community-based organizations, or local non-governmental organizations which are not directly affiliated with the state or a local school district. … The state does not administer the adult education programs, set their curricula, or determine their schedules. The state simply sets ‘performance targets’ for these adult education programs. That there are funding penalties for failure to meet such targets does not show control by the state.

“Third, the adult education programs do not resemble preschool, elementary school, or secondary school. …

“… [B]y interpreting the IDEA’s use of ‘public education’ so broadly as to encompass adult education programs in Rhode Island, the majority has imposed on Rhode Island choices that the state did not make. …”

K.L. v. Rhode Island Board of Education, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-224-18) (47 pages) (Lipez, J.) (Lynch, J., dissenting) Appeal from a decision by Smith, J., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Jason H. Kim, with whom Sonja L. Deyoe and Paul Aston were on brief, for appellant; Paul Sullivan for appellees. (No. 17-1517) (Oct. 29, 2018).

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