Employment – Retaliation – First Amendment

Where a plaintiff has alleged that the defendant police chief retaliated against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because an objectively reasonable official in his position could have believed that his conduct did not violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

“At some point prior to May 18, 2021, [the plaintiff], then a lieutenant in the Uniform Division, learned while at work that [the defendant] was improperly recording compensatory time for himself and his subordinates. … [The plaintiff] attended a meeting of the Department’s superior officers’ union on May 18, 2021, … while he was off-duty. … At the meeting, [the plaintiff] spoke regarding benefits some members, including in the Major Crimes Division, were receiving outside of the union contract. …

“… Where a public employee contends that his government employer took an adverse employment action that violated his First Amendment rights, the First Circuit has articulated a three-part inquiry. Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 2011). First, the Court ‘must determine whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern’ and, second, ‘balance … the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’ …

“Here, [the defendant] challenges the first element, arguing that [the plaintiff] did not speak as a private citizen during the May 18, 2021 union meeting. …

“… Considering, however, the full scope of the relevant factors and drawing all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff]’s favor, the Court concludes that given what a reasonable juror could find regarding the circumstances of [the plaintiff]’s speech, [the plaintiff] was speaking as a citizen during the union meeting. …

“As to [the defendant]’s primary argument, that [the plaintiff]’s speech was a report of illegality pursuant to his official duties, … the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could find otherwise based on the full context of the record evidence. …

“Considering all of these factors together, the Court concludes that, ‘given what a reasonable juror could find about the circumstances in which’ [the plaintiff] spoke during the union meeting, he was speaking in his capacity as a citizen. … Accordingly, the Court denies this basis for allowing the motion for summary judgment. …

“The Court, however, concludes that summary judgment for [the defendant] is warranted on the separate ground of qualified immunity. …

“… In his qualified immunity argument, D. 26 at 18-20 (to which [the plaintiff] did not respond, D. 32 at 17-26), [the defendant] focuses on the second half of the second prong of the qualified immunity determination, arguing that he reasonably could have believed that [the plaintiff]’s speech at the union meeting was that of a public employee. … The Court concludes that, even assuming that [the plaintiff] has made out a First Amendment violation in connection with the promotion decisions, [the defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity because an objectively reasonable official in his position could have believed that his conduct did not violate [the plaintiff]’s constitutional rights.”

Costa v. City of Fall River, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-353-26) (22 pages) (Casper, C.J.) (Docket No. 24-cv-12456-DJC) (July 15, 2026).

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