Civil practice – Commitment

Where a petition for involuntary commitment filed by BayRidge Hospital was allowed by a District Court judge, the order of commitment must be vacated because the information before the judge did not permit a conclusion that the petition was filed pursuant to the requirements of G.L.c. 123, §7.

Reversed.

“M.M. was involuntarily committed to BayRidge Hospital in October 2021 by an order of civil commitment issued by a District Court judge, pursuant to G.L.c. 123, §§7(a) and 8. The Appellate Division of the District Court Department (Appellate Division) affirmed the order of commitment and M.M. filed an appeal to this court. On appeal, M.M. claims that the person who signed the petition did not qualify as a person authorized to do so pursuant to G.L.c. 123, §§1 and 7(a). We agree that the record evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the person who signed the petition is a ‘superintendent’ or ‘other head’ of a facility, and we therefore reverse the decision and order of the Appellate Division. …

“Here, the judge reviewing the petition was presented with conflicting information concerning the signatory’s title. It follows that the petition, on its face, raises the question whether the petitioner is a ‘superintendent’ or ‘other head’ of a facility, or the designee of such a person with the authority to file the petition. Given this ambiguity in the commitment petition, the judge must resolve this factual challenge while giving no presumptive weight to the petition. …

“The decision and order of the Appellate Division is reversed, and a new order shall enter vacating the order of civil commitment pursuant to G.L.c. 123, §§7 and 8.”

In the Matter of M.M. (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-050-26) (9 pages) (D’Angelo, J.) The case was heard by Asha White, J., in District Court. Christine Hamilton Queiroz for M.M.; Thomas F. Schiavoni for the petitioner (Docket No. 25-P-854) (July 13, 2026).

Click here to read the full text of the opinion.