Civil rights – Excessive force – Qualified immunity

Where a plaintiff brought suit for injuries he sustained during a traffic stop, one of the defendant officers violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, but qualified immunity precludes liability on the plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

“This case arises out of a traffic stop in Manchester, New Hampshire, which escalated into a physical struggle between several police officers and Brandon Velez. After Velez did not immediately comply with orders to step out of his vehicle, two officers physically attempted to remove him and overcome his firm resistance. In the process, one officer struck Velez four times and tased him twice. Velez later sued several of the officers and the City of Manchester (the ‘City’) under federal and state common law for injuries he sustained during the incident. In response, they filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. … Velez now appeals. While we conclude that one of the officers used excessive force, we affirm the district court on all counts. …

“In sum, after evaluating the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ … we conclude that [defendant Erik] Slocum violated Velez’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. …

“All that, though, does not mean that Slocum is liable for damages: The officers invoke a qualified immunity defense. …

“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, Slocum can be held liable only if, at the time of his interaction with Velez, the law ‘clearly established’ that the force that he employed was excessive. …

“… Here, Slocum’s use of force was not so obviously out-of-bounds that it clearly established by its own terms a constitutional violation. Though we conclude above that excessive force was used, we think the circumstances nonetheless present a close case on which reasonable officers might have concluded otherwise. …

“Next, Velez argues that a reasonable juror could find under both federal and state law that the City failed to adequately train its officers. …

“The mere fact that the officers participated in, or did not object to, the forcible removal of Velez from his car, however, does not perforce demonstrate an unlawful municipal custom. …

“For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment in favor of defendants. The parties shall bear their own costs.”

Velez v. Eutzy, et al. (Lawyers Weekly No. 01-197-25) (26 pages) (Kayatta, J.) Appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire (Docket No. 24-1594) (Sept. 16, 2025).

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