Juvenile – Plea – Immigration consequences

Where a Brazilian citizen who pleaded to being adjudicated a youthful offender filed a motion to withdraw his plea on the ground that his counsel had not provided him adequate advice about the immigration consequences of the plea, a Juvenile Court judge’s decision to deny that motion should be affirmed because the juvenile is unable to demonstrate prejudice from any inadequate advice given by plea counsel.

“In 2013, the juvenile, then sixteen, sexually assaulted three other boys at a high school soccer camp. He eventually pleaded to being adjudicated a youthful offender with respect to two counts of indecent assault and battery of a person fourteen years or older, and three counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon (ABDW). As part of the plea agreement, the juvenile also agreed to be adjudicated delinquent with respect to two counts of assault with intent to rape a child. In 2021, the juvenile filed a motion to withdraw his youthful offender plea on the ground that his counsel had not provided him adequate advice about the immigration consequences of the plea. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359-360, 374 (2010). After holding an evidentiary hearing, a Juvenile Court judge, who was not the plea judge, denied that motion. We agree with the motion judge that the juvenile is unable to demonstrate prejudice from any inadequate advice given by plea counsel. We also are unpersuaded by the juvenile’s argument that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. We therefore affirm. …

“In the case before us, plea counsel — whose testimony the motion judge generally appears to have credited — unequivocally testified that he never discussed with his client what immigration consequences the juvenile would face had he gone to trial. There was no evidence to the contrary. If the judge implicitly credited plea counsel’s testimony on this point, then an argument could be made that the advice counsel provided about the immigration consequences of pleading guilty was inadequate. In the end, we need not resolve these issues, because we agree with the judge that, in any event, the juvenile is unable to demonstrate prejudice. …

“To the extent that the juvenile contends that there was an appreciable chance a jury would have acquitted him altogether, we disagree. …

“In sum, we agree with the motion judge that there was little chance that the juvenile could have avoided the immigration consequences of his plea agreement by going to trial. …

“As to whether the juvenile might have negotiated a plea agreement that could have avoided adverse immigration consequences, there is simply an absence of proof in the record. …

“The juvenile also argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand the immigration consequences of it. To satisfy due process, a plea must be ‘knowing and voluntary,’ and a plea does not meet that test if the defendant was never informed of the direct consequences of pleading guilty. …

“Despite the dicta in some of the post-Padilla cases, Padilla indisputably is based on the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, not the due process clause. Padilla, 559 24 U.S. at 366. Moreover, it is equally indisputable that Padilla did not alter the general rule that lack of knowledge about the consequences of a guilty plea renders such a plea invalid as unknowing or involuntary only when those consequences are direct. … In sum, we are not persuaded by the juvenile’s argument that, by making passing references to immigration consequences as no longer being considered collateral, the Supreme Judicial Court intended to sweep due process analysis into the calculus. …

“For these reasons, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion or otherwise err in denying the juvenile’s motion to withdraw guilty plea. …

“The order denying the juvenile’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, and the order denying the juvenile’s motion to reconsider, are affirmed.”

Commonwealth v. Taron T., a juvenile (Lawyers Weekly No. 11-043-24) (27 pages) (Milkey, J.) A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty was heard by David B. Paradis, J., and a motion for reconsideration was considered by him. Eva G. Jellison for the juvenile on appeal; Patrick Sadlon for the commonwealth (Docket No. 22-P-1081) (May 24, 2024).

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